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COMMENTS
AT SEA WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JAMES S. CARMICHAEL*
This article presents the development of the law of searches at
sea. The statutes authorizing these searches, the cases construing
these statutes and the constitutional limitations are examined in
detail. Finally, the present trends toward stricter scrutiny of
searches on constitutional grounds are discussed and criticized,
and a suggested framework for future analysis is presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States' involved the
constitutionality of a Border Patrol's warrantless search of an auto-
mobile twenty-five miles north of the Mexican-United States bor-
der. Relying on 8 U.S.C. Section 1357(a)(3),2 a section of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act which authorizes warrantless searches
of cars within a reasonable distance from any border,3 the govern-
ment agents searched defendant's car without probable cause, con-
sent, or reasonable suspicion and found marijuana. Stating that "no
Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution,"' the
Court held the search to be in violation of the fourth amendment
since it could not be classified as a border search or the functional
equivalent of a border search-facts which would have dispensed
* J.D., University of Miami; Former Member, University of Miami Law Review; Lt.
USCG, Ass't District Legal Officer, 14th Coast Guard District, Honolulu, Hawaii.
1. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
2. (1970).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1977) defines "reasonable distance" as within 100 miles of the
border.
4. 413 U.S. at 272.
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with the requirements of probable cause or consent. '
Since the Almeida-Sanchez decision, the lower federal courts
have been faced with arguments by defense counsel that the ration-
ale of that decision should be expanded to closely related areas of
the law involving analogous factual situations. Boardings, searches,
and seizures at sea have recently come under such attacks. The
United States Coast Guard, as the primary enforcer of federal law
at sea,' relies on two statutes for authority to board and search
vessels at sea.7 14 U.S.C. section 89 states:
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations,
inspection, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and
waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the pre-
vention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the
United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and
petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject
to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United
States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's
documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When
from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears
that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person
liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person,
such person shall be arrested . . . or, if it shall appear that a
breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so
as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof,
on board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel,
5. Almeida-Sanchez is further analyzed at notes 169-78 and accompanying text infra.
6. 14 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. VI 1976) establishes the Coast Guard as the primary maritime
agency charged with the enforcement of federal law at sea and sets forth the primary duties
of the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable
Federal laws on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations
for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall develop, estab-
lish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national
defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities
for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States; . . . and shall maintain a state of readi-
ness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war.
A Coast Guard vessel is a warship of the United States and Coast Guard personnel
maintain a state of readiness in addition to peacetime functions of search and rescue, ice-
breaking, fishery patrols, surface law enforcement patrols to prevent smuggling, and adminis-
trative safety inspections to prevent loss of life at sea.
7. "At sea" is a term encompassing internal waters, territorial waters, the contiguous
zone and the high seas. These terms are discussed further in the jurisdiction section, notes
16-18 and accompanying text infra.
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liable to forfeiture . . . such vessel or such merchandise, or both,
shall be seized
Furthermore, the Coast Guard is authorized to board vessels under
customs enforcement provisions. 19 U.S.C. section 1581 states:
(a) Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of
any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within
the customs waters or, as he may be authorized, within a
customs-enforcement area established under sections 1701 and
1703-1711 of this title, or at any other authorized place, without
as well as within his district and examine the manifest and other
documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, truck,
package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel com-
pliance.
(b) Officers of the Department of the Treasury and other per-
sons authorized by such department may go on board of any
vessel at any place in the United States or within the customs
waters and hail, stop, and board such vessel in the enforcement
of the navigation laws.
(e) If upon the examination of any vessel or vehicle it shall
appear that a breach of the laws of the United States is being or
has been committeed so as to render such vessel or vehicle, or the
merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the
United States by, such vessel or vehicle, liable to forfeiture or to
secure any fine or penalty, the same shall be seized and any
person who has engaged in such breach shall be arrested.
(9) any vessel, within or without the customs waters, from
which any merchandise is being, or has been, unlawfully intro-
duced into the United States by means of any boat belonging to,
or owned, controlled, or managed in common with, said vessel,
shall be deemed to be employed within the United States and,
as such, subject to the provisions of this section.'
8. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1970) (emphasis added). 14 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i)
(Supp. VI 1976), and 19 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1970) provide that Coast Guard commissioned
officers, warrant officers and petty officers are deemed to be officers of the customs. Customs
waters are defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (Supp. VI 1976) as waters within distances allowed
by treaties and, for every other vessel, water within four leagues (12 miles) of the United
States' coast. A customs-enforcement area created under 19 U.S.C. 88 1701, 1703-11 may
extend up to 62 miles outward from the coast and laterally up to 100 miles in each direction,
thus creating a rectangular enforcement zone of 200 miles by 62 miles. For an excellent
discussion of this zone see FIcKEN, The 1935 Anti.Smuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcot-
19771
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The Coast Guard boards vessels under the authority of these
two statutes for enforcement of the motorboat and navigation laws, 0
customs laws," general federal law enforcement," and security
boardings. Motorboat and navigation laws deal with vessel docu-
mentation, registry, enrollment, licensing, numbering, navigation
rules, equipment standards and operator qualifications, all imple-
mented to insure safety at sea. The customs laws require manifest-
ing of cargo and reporting of goods landed in the United States so
that proper duties are paid. Inherent in the customs laws is the
suppression of smuggling contraband items. Smuggling by vessels
has always been, and continues to be, a primary method of import-
ing contraband. The customs laws are integrally related to the mo-
torboat and navigation laws in that a vessel must be certified sea-
worthy to carry any cargo and must be documented to that effect.
The Coast Guard effects general federal law enforcement when it
renders assistance to other governmental agencies in their primary
fields of responsibility. This includes, inter alia, enforcement of con-
servation, criminal, immigration, pollution, quarantine and na-
tional security laws. The security laws are designed to prevent sub-
versive acts such as sabotage or the introduction of weapons, per-
sons, or cargo inimical to national security. It is arguable that cus-
toms laws are closely related to this area, especially with regard to
prohibition of the smuggling of narcotics. Further, it is possible that
Coast Guard boardings may encompass only one or all of these
purposes and a restraint in one area must be examined for its effect
in the others.
The analogy of Coast Guard boardings and searches to the
Almeida-Sanchez fact pattern has been made:
A government roving border patrol [Coast Guard] assigned to a
certain highway [channel] some 25 miles [270 miles] north of
ics Smugglers Beyond the Contiguous Zone: An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 700 (1975). A manifest is a summary of all the bills of lading and is required
for the protection of the ship and the owners of cargo. It is the vessel master's duty to insure
that it is carried on board. The fact that cargo cannot be lawfully imported does not dispense
with the necessity of a manifest. United States v. Sischo, 262 U.S. 165 (1922). The purpose
behind a manifest is not only for the collection of duties, but also to enable the government
to ascertain the ship's cargo without having to search.
10. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 277 (1970) (examination of the register, enrollment, and license of
American vessels); Coordinated National Boating Safety Program, 46 U.S.C. § 1451-89
(1970). For navigation requirements, see generally Title 33, United States Code. For shipping
requirements see generally Title 46, United States Code.
11. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (a) (1970). See generally Title 19, United States Code.
12. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 772(d), 776(d), 916(g), 990, 1027, 1081-86, 1091-94 (1970) (board-
ings & searches for fisheries violations); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1970) (oil pollution control).
For laws relating to public health and welfare, see generally Title 42, United States Code.
[Vol. 32:51
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the Mexican Border [from the United States territorial waters]
was 'directing eyesight [radar] surveillance toward vehicles trav-
eling the road [sea-lane] by all outward appearances legally.
The patrol [cutter] arbitrarily singled out a vehicle [vessel],
stopped it, asked questions of the driver [captain], inspected
and searched it from front to rear [stem to stern], and eventually
uncovered a cache of marijuana. All in the 'asserted interest' of
detecting the importation of illegal aliens [detecting safety and
fishery violations].3
On its face, the analogy appears to be sound.
II. JURISDICTION
The broad authority of 14 U.S.C. section 89(a) and 19 U.S.C.
section 1581(a) is limited by jurisdictional phrasing. Section 89(a)
authorizes searches "upon the high seas and waters over which the
United States has jurisdiction" and allows Coast Guard officers to
"board. . .any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation
of any law, of the United States." Section 1581(a) authorizes
searches of any vessel or vehicle "at any place in the United States
or within the customs waters or . . .within a customs-enforcement
area. . . or at any other authorized place."' 4 The power is conferred
not only over American vessels but also over foreign vessels. This
fact requires that the jurisdictional discussion encompass a brief
analysis of the international law of the sea. Since the contraband
most frequently uncovered by the Coast Guard is a controlled nar-
cotic, the provisions of Title 21, United States Code, also will be
discussed.'5
13. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, United States v. One Forty-Three Foot Sailing Vessel,
538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976).
14. For statutory definitions of terms contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) see note 9 supra.
15. The Title 21 provisions most frequently applicable are: 21 U.S.C. § 812 (schedule of
controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (unlawful to intentionally manufacture, distribute,
dispense, or possess a controlled substance); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (penalty for simple posses-
sion); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (attempt or conspiracy to commit defined offenses); 21 U.S.C. § 952
(unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States); 21 U.S.C. § 955 (unlaw-
ful for any person to bring or possess on board any vessel arriving in or departing from the
United States or the customs territory of the United States); 21 U.S.C. § 960 (penalty for
violation of § 952 or § 955); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (attempt or conspiracy to commit defined
offenses); 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1970) (defines import as "any bringing in or introduction of
such article into any area (whether or not such bringing in or introduction constitutes an
importation within the meaning of the tariff laws of the United States)"). Otherwise customs
territory is defined by headnote 2 to the tariff schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. §
1202) as including only the States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Congress failed
to include customs waters of the United States in this definition; however, 21 U.S.C. § 802(26)
(1970) defines the term "United States" when used in a geographical sense, as "all places
and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," and
would thus appear to encompass customs waters.
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Prior to a discussion of the amount of power which may be
applied, it is necessary to define the areas of water in and around
nation states wherein different rights, duties and claims are applica-
ble. There are basically three divisions of the waters: internal wa-
ters, territofial sea, and high seas. The latter encompasses an area
known as the contiguous zone. The three mile limit" of the terri-
torial sea refers to "that body of the geas which is included within
a definite maritime belt immediately adjacent to a state's coastline.
Territorial seas do not include, but are seaward of, rivers, most bays,
some gulfs, straits, lakes, ports and roadsteads, such being consid-
ered to be internal, or national, waters."'" Seaward of this three mile
limit is the high seas. However, for implementation of certain
United States law, there is a contiguous zone which extends nine
miles from the three mile boundary, or in other words, to a boundary
between three and twelve miles from the coast. "
Underlying the classifications above is a concept of freedom of
the seas. With deference to this freedom, states have certain inter-
dependent rights and duties incident to their sovereignty which
form the basis of their relations with the community of nations.
Within this framework, the claims a state makes to authority over
internal waters is almost as comprehensive as that made with regard
to sovereignty over its land. "
National security in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
depended on the ability of a nation to control activities off its coast.
This resulted in the concept of a territorial sea. It is now settled by
the usage of states and the principles of international law that all
states possess sovereign rights within this marginal belt.2 The
16. At sea, distances are measured in nautical miles. There are 60 nautical miles in one
degree of latitude making a nautical mile equal to 6,076.12 feet or 1853 meters or approxi-
mately 2000 yards. One marine league is equal to three nautical miles. C. COLOMaos, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF THE SEA 88 (6th ed. 1967).
17. B. BRITTIN & L. WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 78 (3d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as BRITrIN].
18. See notes 32-43 infra and accompanying text.
19. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 92, 93 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as McDOUGALI. Specifically the claims are: (1) claims to control access to
internal waters; (2) claims to apply authority to vessels; (3) claims to prescribe policy for
activities directly relating to the use of internal waters; (4) claims to prescribe and apply
policy to events on board ship while in internal waters; and (5) claims relating to resources.
20. H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 51 (1975-76 ed.).
See also BRITTIN, supra note 17, at 96. For a thorough discussion of the genesis of the territorial
sea, see Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REv.
597 (1959). In accordance with the underlying concept of self-preservation a state may exer-
cise rights with regard to: (1) jurisdiction over foreign ships of war and foreign merchant
vessels; (2) police, customs and revenue functions; (3) fishery regulations; (4) maritime cere-
monials; and (5) establishment of defense zones. C. COLOMaOS, supra note 16, at 132. Interna-
[Vol. 32:51
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United States adopted a zone of uniform breadth for purposes of
neutrality in 1793.21 This zone was reiterated by Congress and de-
fined as "a marine league" in 1794.22 The Supreme Court recognized
the plenary nature of the jurisdiction within territorial waters in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon. 2 3 The dictum from Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in that case was applied in Cunard S.S. Co. v.
Mellon24 wherein the Court held that territory of the United States,
as designated by the eighteenth amendment, included the estab-
lished three mile limit and that since the United States possessed
plenary jurisdiction in its territorial waters, it had the power to
apply prohibition measures against foreign vessels therein. Al-
though the concept of plenary jurisdiction is not questioned, Cunard
has been criticized for its implications regarding the right of inno-
cent passage.
Although transient vessels in the territorial sea must obey rea-
sonable rules and regulations promulgated by the littoral state for
the safety of navigation and maritime police, the littoral sovereign's
conduct may not amount to an unreasonable interference with the
navigation of a foreign vessel merely innocently transiting the terri-
torial sea."5 In general, all ships enjoy a right of innocent passage,
but the exclusive interest of a state in its territorial sea obligates it
to insure those waters are not used for acts contrary to the rights of
other countries. A coastal state also has the right to take necessary
steps to protect itself against acts prejudicial to its security. It may
board a foreign merchant ship passing through its-territorial waters
to arrest a person or investigate a crime allegedly taking place
within its territorial seas if the consequences of the crime extend
beyond the ship and disturb the peace of the coastal state." Ap-
praisal of coastal state action, such as boarding and searching a
foreign vessel, is based upon a balance between the interests of the
general community in freedom of navigation and the interests of
particular states in their own value processes. Factors in determin-
ing what is reasonable in view of all the circumstances include: the
tional agreement with regard to rights in the territorial sea is contained in the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, arts. 1-13, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608-10.
21. See Note from Secretary Jefferson to the British Minister, Nov. 8, 1793 in 1 MOORE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 702-03 (1906).
22. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 384.
23. 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812) (dictum). A coastal state possesses "full and absolute terri-
torial jurisdiction" within a band of sea one league in breadth along its coast.
24. 262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923).
25. P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 121 (1927).
To take advantage of the doctrine of innocent passage a vessel must be in passage. Generally,
if it is entering port or anchoring, its status is like that of a vessel in port.
26. BsrrrIN, supra note 17, at 96-100.
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consequentiality and range of interests sought to be protected by the
coastal state, the scope of authority claimed, the importance of the
area for navigation, the impact of non-interference on the coastal
state, and alternate sanctions available for coastal protection. The
interest to be protected should be one regarded as important in the
community of nations. 7
The high seas are generally not subject to the sovereignty of any
state, yet reasonable regard must be given to the rights of others
to use the high seas. Thus, many regulations exist through conven-
tions and treaties on the safety of life and traffic at sea, salvage,
fisheries, prevention of pollution, and suppression of piracy and
slave trade. 9 Control of ship movements to avoid collisions is crucial
to effective commerce. Control of ship construction, licensing, man-
ning and all other aspects of the seagoing industry is also critical to
insure safety at sea. The state whose flag a vessel flies is duty bound
by international law to establish and police safety standards effec-
tively. 0 To carry out the international duty to suppress piracy, a
state's warships may approach the merchant ship of any nation and
determine her identity and nationality."
Due to the plenary jurisdiction exercisable within the territorial
sea, its breadth has been limited. This limitation has not always
allowed the coastal state to protect its values effectively. Ocean
transportation is a source of wealth but it also may be used to
deprive a state of this wealth; for example, cargo may be destined
to enter the state in violation of its laws. Since the methods of
smuggling are so varied, and the difficulty of policing a vast coast-
line so great, the exercise of preventative measures at a greater
distance from the coast is required. The resultant exercise of juris-
diction in the contiguous zone is limited to protection of specific
interests such as customs, security and health laws. Although the
concept of contiguous zones is fully accepted in international law 2
27. McDOUCAL, supra note 19, at 229. Although article 17 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1611 does not explicitly state
that the coastal state may enforce its laws in the territorial sea, it nevertheless appears that
this was one of its objectives.
28. See generally, Convention on the High Seas, [19621 13 U.S.T. 2312.
29. See generally, BairrIN, supra note 17, at 122-47.
30. See article 10, Convention on the High Seas, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2316.
31. See article 22, Convention on the High Seas, [19621 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2318. Full
exercise of the power to stop vessels on the high seas for identification checks is limited to:
(1) acts of interference derived from powers specifically conferred by treaty; (2) suspicion of
piracy; (3) suspicion of engaging in slave trade; and (4) suspicion that a ship, although flying
a foreign flag, is in reality of the same nationality as the warship.
32. See article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, [1964]
15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612-13. Therein the zone is limited to 12 miles.
[Vol. 32:51
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and a vast number of measures have been adopted with regard to
customs enforcement, the language of the present Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone does not appear to extend
the sphere of validity of a state's laws into the contiguous zone. It
appears that infringement of the state's laws must occur within its
territory or territorial sea. In practice, however, and consequently
as a matter of present international custom, the contiguous zone
extends a state's powers beyond the territorial sea.3 The crucial
international law question to be asked is whether the state's action
is reasonably calculated to secure a professed interest substantial
enough to outweight the intrusion. 4
In 1790 the United States, following Britain's lead, enacted
legislation designed to prevent smuggling. This legislation was
made applicable to vessels within four leagues of the coast.35 Three
Supreme Court cases during the early 1800's reflected, in dicta, the
view of the Court with regard to the revenue statutes. Church v.
Hubbart" dealt with an action on an insurance policy written on an
American vessel which excepted losses arising from illicit trade with
another nation's colony. The vessel had been seized from four to five
leagues off the coast of the colony, and the insured claimed that
because the seizure was unlawful the policy should cover the loss.
The Court stated:
The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and
exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon
by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile
act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from
injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its terri-
tory. . . . If [the means] are such as are reasonable and neces-
sary to secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted
to ....
Indeed, the right given to our own revenue cutters, to visit
vessels four leagues from our coast, is a declaration that in the
opinion of the American government, no such principle as that
contended for has a real existence.37
33. KNIGHT, supra note 20, at 85. See generally, Comment, Maritime Contiguous Zones,
62 MIH. L. REv. 848 (1964), wherein the author argues that a contiguous zone would be of
little value if preventative or punitive action could not be taken within the zone.
34. McDOUGAL, supra note 19, at 576-80 discusses the state's competence to prescribe
and apply its laws in the contiguous zone.
35. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790). See note 74 infra and accompanying text. This 1790
legislation has remained the basis of American law in the contiguous zone for customs en-
forcement. For a discussion of the development of smuggling legislation and early jurisdic-
tional court decisions see W. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1929).
36. 6 U.S. 187 (1804).
37. Id. at 234-35.
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In Rose v. Himely,38 an American vessel had been seized ten
leagues from the coast of Santo Domingo for a breach of French
municipal law. The vessel was later condemned by a French Court
in Santo Domingo while it was in the waters of South Carolina.
Chief Justice Marshall held the French degree void finding that the
vessel was not within the French Court's jurisdiction. The Court
also noted that the arrete, under which the seizure was made, only
provided for seizure within two leagues of the coast and had stated
that the seizure of a vessel on the high seas not belonging to a
subject for the breach of a municipal regulation, was an act which
a sovereign could not authorize.
Although the dicta appeared to be contrary to Church, the
Court in Hudson v. Guestier upheld the condemnation by a French
court of the cargo of an American vessel seized six leagues from
shore for a violation of a municipal law of France prohibiting trading
with colonies in revolt. The Court strongly intimated that a sover-
eign's power might be exercised not only to prevent an impending
injury but also to punish for one which had been consummated."
In The Betsey,4 Judge Story, while discussing section 27 of the
1799 customs act forbidding unloading within four leagues of the
coast without the payment of duties, stated: "[T]he policy of the
act applies equally to all vessels; and indeed more strongly to foreign
vessels; since frauds committed by them in evasion of the revenue
laws are less easily detected, than like frauds are under the regula-
tions applicable to American vessels."4 The same section was dis-
cussed in The Coquitlam43 by the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the
lower court by stating that the cargo unloaded within four leagues
must be bound for the United States and there must be an intent
to avoid payment of duties. The district court had held that once a
vessel entered within four leagues it had "arrived" and should be
treated as bound for the United States. The circuit court refused to
38. 8 U.S. 241 (1808).
39. 10 U.S. 281 (1810).
40. During this early period the tenor of the Supreme Court cases with regard to probable
cause for boarding, searching and seizing was one of questioning probable cause for seizure
and questioning whether the vessel was bound for the United States in fact. The validity of
the boarding was apparently presumed. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64,
121-23 (1804) (grounds creating substantial reason for believing vessel and cargo liable to
seizure discovered after boarding); The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1824) (stated the right
of visitation was limited to American vessels within 12 miles and foreign vessels within the
same distance if bound for the United States and then discussed probable cause for seizure).
See also The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1, 50 (1826).
41. 3 F.Cas. 303 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1365).
42. Id. at 304.
43. 77 F. 744 (9th Cir. 1896).
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hold that the statute prohibited unloading from every vessel that
arrived within the customs zone.
Before 1920, illicit trade was carried on mainly from foreign and
domestic vessels in port or from small American vessels that cruised
near the coast." Subsequently, however, the government's authority
to apply its customs laws to vessels within twelve miles of the coast
and bound for the United States became inadequate to handle the
smuggling of liquor. Demand for the product and the use of high
speed craft for transshipment from hovering vessels to the United
States caused Congress to expand enforcement of prohibition laws
to certain ships irrespective of destination. 5 The Henry L.
Marshall," although dealing with a statutory violation arising when
the "bound for" language was still required, held that a British
vessel which was found with two clearances, no manifest and 1250
cases of liquor on board, and was sailing along the United States
coast would not be heard to deny it was bound for the United States
since its real objective was to transship the liquor to smaller Ameri-
can vessels. The court felt that the decision was in accord with the
design of the customs and revenues laws especially since, in the
interim between arrest and appeal, the "bound for" language had
been removed from the statute.
At least as to foreign vessels, the statutory predecessors could
not, and present section 1581(a) cannot, take general jurisdiction
over all vessels within twelve miles, as this would violate inter-
national law's concept of freedom of the seas. It appears that some
standard must be met before a foreign vessel is subject to search
or seizure. If it is not known whether the vessel is bound for the
United States, then there must be a reasonable suspicion, arising
from conduct or-previous information, that the vessel is engaged in
smuggling operations. 7
In 1927 the Supreme Court decided two cases clarifying juris-
dictional principles pertaining to American flag vessels. In Maul v.
United States," an American vessel enrolled and licensed for the
coastwise trade was seized by Coast Guard officers thirty-four miles
44. W. MASTERSON, supra note 35, at 205.
45. 42 Stat. 989 (1922). Congress no doubt wished to bring within the terms of the law
the "rumfleet" hovering off the coast with no intention of entering port. W. MASTERSON, supra
note 35, at 229. See also, McDOUGAL, supra note 19, at 588.
46. 292 F. 486 (2d Cir. 1923).
47. A different standard under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1970) for foreign vessels and Ameri-
can vessels with regard to boardings and searches would likely not be a violation of equal
protection guaranteed by the Constitution since international ramifications create a rational
basis for the distinction.
48. 274 U.S. 501 (1927).
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from shore for being on a foreign voyage without being duly regis-
tered. The issue was whether the vessel could be seized outside the
twelve mile limit. After tracing the statutory history of section 3072
of the Revised Statutes, the Court responded to defendant's conten-
tion that section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922 was the sole authority
for Coast Guard officers to seize by stating that section 581 did not
repeal section 3072 of the Revised Statutes.
[The former] provides primarily for boarding and searching ves-
sels, within prescribed limits, to discover and prevent intended
smuggling, and secondarily for the prompt seizure of the vessel
by the searching officer if the search discloses a violation of law
which subjects her to forfeiture. The other provides broadly, and
without restriction as to place, for the seizure of vessels which,
through violation of the laws respecting revenue, have become
liable to seizure24
The Court continued:
If Congress were without power to provide for the seizure of such
vessels on the high sea, a restrictive construction might be justi-
fied. But there is no want of power in this regard. The high sea is
common to all nations and foreign to none; and every nation
having vessels there has power to regulate them and also to seize
them for a violation of its laws.0
Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred, not on a construction of
section 3072 because they felt that seizure for a violation of naviga-
tion laws was not seizure for a violation of laws "respecting the
revenue," but rather on a ground that the authority was to be im-
plied as an incident of the police duties of the ocean patrol. They
found that the authority of the Revenue Cutter Service had been
extended into numerous fields of operation including enforcement
of navigation laws.5 The concurring Justices stated: "There is no
limitation upon the right of the sovereign to seize, without a war-
rant, vessels registered under its laws, similar to that imposed by
the common law and the Constitution upon the arrest of persons
and upon the seizure of 'papers and effects.' ""2 Referring to a com-
parison of section 581 and section 3072 they stated:
There is no foundation for the assumption of the claimant that
the first paragraph of § 581 was intended as the exclusive grant
49. Id. at 507.
50. Id. at 511.
51. Id. at 515-17. These duties are presently compiled in 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
52. 274 U.S. at 524 (footnote omitted).
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of the power to seize. The primary purpose of that paragraph was
not to provide for the seizure of American vessels of known or
suspected guilt. It was to facilitate, by means of boarding and
examination of manifest before arrival in port, both the entry of
admittedly innocent vessels and the collection of revenues. This
end was furthered by enabling customs officers to board and
search any vessel, foreign or domestic, within the stated limits,
without the necessity of establishing probable cause. The author-
ity to board and search foreign vessels beyond the territorial lim-
its would doubtless not have been implied as a mere incident of
the customs officers' duties, and it is probable that the authority
to board and search American vessels in the absence of probable
cause was not regarded as clear.53
The response of Congress to Justices Brandeis' and Holmes' concur-
ring opinion was the legislative predecessor to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).5 1
In United States v. Lee,5 the defendant had been taken from
an American vessel which had just taken on liquors from a foreign
vessel twenty-four miles at sea. The defendant had intended to
carry the liquor ashore; however, all of the evidence against defen-
dant was obtained by the seizure. The lower court had held the
evidence inadmissable because the search was thought to be unlaw-
ful and the seizure unauthorized since made beyond twelve miles.5"
The Supreme Court, citing Maul, reversed, stating:
From [the power to seize beyond twelve miles] it is fairly to be
inferred that [Coast Guard officers] are likewise authorized to
board and search such vessels when there is probable cause to
believe them subject to seizure for violation of revenue laws, and
to arrest persons thereon engaged in such violation."
Section 8 of article I of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to punish felonies committed on the high seas,
and section 2 of article III extends the judicial power of the United
States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In United
States v. Flores,5" the Court stated that the criminal jurisdiction of
53. Id. at 529-30 (emphasis added).
54. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 705, 49 Stat. 1820. See H.R. 12305, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936).
55. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
56. The circuit court opinion is found at 14 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1926). The court had added
that the seizure would have been lawful if the government had "adopted" the act by institut-
ing forfeiture proceedings against the vessel and its liquor cargo. This is supported by The
Richmond, 13 U.S. 102, 104 (1815) ("the law does not connect [the] trespass, if it be one,
with the subsequent seizure by the civil authority under the process of the District
Court .. "). But see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). See
also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
57. 274 U.S. at 562.
58. 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
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the United States is statutory and is generally based on a territorial
principle. Although not given extraterritorial effect by implication,
this limitation is not deemed applicable to merchant vessels flying
the sovereign's flag as they are deemed to be part of the territory of
that sovereignty even within the territorial limits of another state. 9
It appears that the key is whether a specific statute punishes of-
fenses on a United States vessel out of the jurisdiction of a state
when committed within the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States." The United States also ascribes to the
objective view of the territorial principle wherein jurisdiction is ex-
tended over all acts having an effect within the state even though
the acts occur elsewhere. 6 There is also authority, both in interna-
tional law and in United States law, for the protective principle of
jurisdiction by which a state may prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its
security and operation. Under this theory, all the elements of the
crime may occur outside the territory of the state but jurisdiction
exists because of the potential for adverse effects on security.2 Fur-
thermore, a defendant in a criminal trial, whether citizen or alien,
whether arrested within United States territory or without, cannot
challenge a court's jurisdiction because his presence was secured
unlawfully."
Three other aspects of jurisdiction deserve brief mention: treat-
ies, the doctrine of hot pursuit, and extended customs zones. Al-
though treaties are not considered as evidence of a signatory's belief
in international custom, they do constitute recognition that author-
ity exercised over vessels of the signatory beyond the territorial sea
is entirely reasonable. During the prohibition era, Great Britain's
refusal to acknowledge our customs enforcement zone extending to
twelve miles led to the Treaty of May 22, 1924.4 The treaty allowed
the United States, within a zone from the coast to a distance which
could be traversed by the foreign vessel within an hour: (1) to board
and examine the papers; (2) to search if suspicions were aroused;
and (3) to seize if reasonable cause existed for believing the vessel
was committing offenses against the United States."
59. Id. at 155-57. Flores held United States law applicable to the murder of an American
by an American on a United States vessel while in foreign territorial waters.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
61. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882
(5th Cir. 1967).
62. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968);
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961).
63. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
64. 43 Stat. 1761.
65, The treaty was interpreted and found to supersede § 581 of the Tariff Act in Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
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The right of hot pursuit is recognized in article 23 of the Con-
vention on the High Seas.6 Pursuit may be commenced when the
coastal state has good reason to believe the vessel has violated the
state's laws and when the vessel or its boat is in internal waters, the
territorial sea or the contiguous zone. 7 A visual or auditory signal
must be given to stop and the pursuit must not be interrupted.
An extended customs enforcement zone may be created pur-
suant to authority granted by the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act." The
President (or his congressionally appointed representative) is able
to designate temporary zones encompassing an area sixty-two miles
from the coast and 100 miles in both directions laterally upon a
determination that vessels are hovering off the coast and smuggling
is likely to occur. The rights relating to customs enforcement, exer-
cisable in the normal contiguous zone, would be applicable in the
extended zone. 9
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
"One of the oldest functions of the United States Coast Guard70
is the boarding of vessels in the enforcement of Federal law."', The
Coast Guard was created in 1915 by a consolidation of the Revenue
Cutter Service and the Life Saving Service.7" Authority to board
vessels was given to the Revenue Cutter Service upon its inception
in 1790 in "[a]n act to provide more effectually for the collection
of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares and merchandise
imported into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or
66. Convention on the High Seas, [19621 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2318-19.
67. It appears clear that article 23 authorizes hot pursuit for acts committed in the
contiguous zone which the state has good reason- to believe are in violation of the laws
applicable within the contiguous zone. McDOUOAL, supra note 19, at 920.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970).
69. See, The 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Beyond
the Contiguous Zone: An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 700
(1975). See also U.S. Ctast Guard Cmdt. Inst. 5920.6 (15 April 1976) for implementation
guidelines for law enforcement actions against hovering vessels.
70. The Coast Guard is the primary agency for enforcement of federal laws at sea. At
times the Coast Guard enforces customs laws and immigration laws and in such posture is
restricted by the regulations of the departments primarily responsible for enforcement of
those laws. Although this paper will continually refer to the law of search and seizure as it
affects Coast Guard procedures, there are aspects of this analysis which are applicable to
these other agencies in so far as their duties may be carried out at sea. This comment relates
specifically to the Coast Guard since its authority to board vessels for customs enforcement
is interlocked with other provisions of the United States Code which necessarily qualify any
discussion of the applicability of the fourth amendment to Coast Guard operations.
71. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD BOARDING MANUAL 1-1 (CG-253, 1972).
72. An Act to Create the Coast Guard, ch. 20, 38 Stat. 800 (1915). The Lifesaving Service
was created by ch. 344, 18 Stat. 125 (1874).
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vessels."" Specifically, section 31 of that act stated:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors,
inspectors, and the officers of the revenue cutters . . . to go on
board of ships or vessels in any part of the United States, or
within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United
States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the
purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining
and searching the said ships or vessels; and the said officers re-
spectively shall have free access to the cabin, and every other part
of a ship or vessel. . . .7
The primary purpose of this statute was to account for all cargo and
to insure that proper duties were paid. There is no qualifying lan-
guage limiting the power of the Revenue Cutter officers to board any
vessel except that within the twelve mile (four league) zone the
vessel had to be bound for the United States. Evidence that the first
Congress was mindful of limitations on the power to search can be
found in section 48 of the same act:
That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person
specifically appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall
have full power and authority to enter any ship or vessel in which
they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchan-
dise subject to duty shall be concealed: and therein to search for,
seize and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise. And if
they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof in any
particular dwelling-house, store, building or other place, they or
either of them shall, upon application on oath to any justice of
the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store or
other place (in the daytime only) and there to search for such
goods . . ..
73. Ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (1790). Ch. 35, § 62, 1 Stat. 175 (1790) created the Revenue Cutter
Service. Section 64 stated:
That the officers of the [boats or cutters to be employed for the protection of the
revenue], shall be appointed by the President of the United States, and shall
respectively be deemed officers of the customs, and shall have power and author-
ity to go on board of every ship or vessel which shall arrive within the United
States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound for the United States,
and to search and examine the same and every part thereof, and to demand,
receive and certify the manifests herein before required to be on board of certain
ships or vessels. ...
Ch. 35, § 64, 1 Stat. 175 (1790) (emphasis added).
74. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790).
75. Ch. 35, § 48, 1 Stat. 170 (1790). Except for the deletion of "or affirmation" after
"oath," this is a verbatim transcription of the inspection provision enacted by the First
Congress in its first session. Customs Act, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 (1789). This earlier statute
is frequently cited as the seminal statute for searches at sea. Such citation appears to be
incorrect in view of the 1790 legislation passed by the same Congress. Another statute fre-
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The chronological order of these statutes enacted by the First Con-
gress and the subjects with which they deal suggest that Congress
was following the normal flow of goods from the transit stage, sec-
tions 22 and 23, to the landed and storage stage, section 31.11 The
relevant portions of the act of 1790 were re-enacted without substan-
tial changes in 179911 and remained unchanged until 1866. Then in
"[a]n Act further to prevent Smuggling and for other Purposes"
Congress stated it would be
lawful for any officer of the customs . . . or of a revenue cutter
...to go on board of any vessel, as well without as within his
district, and to inspect, search, and examine the same, and any
person, trunk, or envelope on board, and to this end, to hail and
stop such vessel if under way, and to use all necessary force to
compel compliance; and if it shall appear that any breach or
violation of the laws of the United States has been committed,
whereby or in consequence of which, such vessel, or the goods,
wares, and merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of or im-
ported by such vessel, is or are liable to forfeiture, to make seizure
of the same, or either or any part thereof, and to arrest, or in case
of escape, or any attempt to escape, to pursue and arrest any
person engaged in such breach or violation .... 11
quently cited for the proposition that probable cause is required for searches at sea is ch. 5,
§ 36, 1 Stat. 47 (1789):
And when any prosecution shall be commenced on account of the seizure of
any ship or vessel, goods, wares or merchandise, and judgment shall be given for
the claimant or claimants; if it shall appear to the court before whom such prose-
cution shall be tried, that there was a reasonable cause of seizure, the same court
shall cause a proper certificate or entry to be made thereof, and in such case the
claimant shall not be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the seizure,
or the prosecutor be liable to action, judgment . . .or prosecution (emphasis
added).
However, it is apparent that liability is grounded on a seizure without probable cause and
that the section does not relate to boardings and searches.
76. The context of ch. 5, § § 22-24, 1 Stat. 42-43 (1789) supports this contention. Section
22 begins: "That when it shall appear that any goods, wares or merchandise of which entry
shall have been made ...." Section 23 commences with: "That it shall be lawful for the
collector, or other officer of, the customs, after entry made of any goods ...... Ch. 35, § 31,
1 Stat. 164 (1790) flows from ch. 5, § 11, 1 Stat. 38-39 (1789). The earlier statute required
vessels to have manifests of cargo and to deliver them to the customs officer on demand. The
latter authorized customs officers to come on board for the purpose of demanding these
manifests when the ship was within four leagues or within bays, harbors, ports, rivers, creeks
or inlets if laden with goods and bound to the United States.
77. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790) was re-enacted as ch. 22, § 54, 1 Stat. 668 (1799); ch.
35, § 48, 1 Stat. 170 (1790) became ch. 22, § 67, 1 Stat. 677 (1799); and ch. 35, § 64, 1 Stat.
175 (1790) became ch. 22, § 99, 1 Stat. 700 (1799).
78. Ch. 201, § 2, 14 Stat. 178 (1866) (emphasis added). This act made a crucial distinc-
tion between searches of vessels and searches of the landlocked counterparts of vessels. A
suspicion standard was established for the latter. Ch. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178 (1866) stated:
[t]hat any of the officers or persons authorized by the second section of this act
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Explicit in this statute is the authority to board and search without
knowledge or suspicion of a violation of United States law. There is
a much broader law enforcement function inherent in this statute
than was contained in prior customs laws. The prior language of the
customs statutes qualifying boarding "within four leagues of the
coast thereof if bound to the United States," is conspicuously ab-
sent. Conceivably this was a recognition that smugglers would al-
ways claim they were not bound for the United States if boarded
outside United States territorial waters but within four leagues of
the coast. Therefore, implicit in this statute was the necessity of an
examination of United States competence to prescribe and apply its
laws at sea.7"
The expanded powers enunciated in 1866 were carried forward
to the Revised Statutes of 1878. Section 276010 reiterated the provi-
sions of the 1790 and 1799 legislation authorizing boarding within
four leagues if the vessel was bound for the United States. Section
3059 restated the broad law enforcement provisions of 1866 under
the title "Enforcement of Duty-Laws and Punishment for Viola-
tions."'" This same title also contained section 3067 which stipu-
lated that
[ult shall be lawful for all collectors ...and the officers of the
revenue-cutters, to go on board of vessels in any port of the
United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound
to the United States ...for the purposes of demanding the
manifests, and of examining and searching the vessels; and those
officers respectively shall have free access to the cabin and every
other part of a vessel.2
It is not immediately apparent from these sections when actual
knowledge of destination was critical to boarding. It seems that in
to board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine, as well without as
within their respective districts any vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom
he or they shall suspect there are goods, wares, or merchandise which are subject
to duty or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon
such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever
found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there are goods which
were imported contrary to law.
79. See generally.section II, JuRIsDIcTIos supra.
80. Title 34, ch. 3, § 2760, Revised Statutes 535 (1878) was a re-enactment of ch. 22, §
99, 1 Stat. 700 (1799).
81. Title 34, ch. 10, § 3059, Revised Statutes 588 (1878) was a restatement of ch. 201, §
2, 14 Stat. 178 (1866). Title 34, ch. 10, § 3061, Revised Statutes 588 brought forward the
suspicion requirement for landlocked carriers from ch. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178 (1866). Title 34,
ch. 10, § 3066, Revised Statutes 589 (1878) stipulated the warrant requirement for a dwelling
house, store or building as previously provided in ch. 22, § 68, 1 Stat. 678 (1799).
82. Title 34, ch. 10, § 3067, Revised Statutes 589 (1878) (a re-enactment of ch. 22, § 54,
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order to demand a manifest, which was only required of ships carry-
ing cargo and either proceeding to an American port or transship-
ping to another vessel destined for an American port, there must
have been suspicion that the vessel or its cargo was bound for the
United States. This requirement has become apparent from the
discussion of international consequences upon boarding foreign ves-
sels. 3 It is obvious that Congress did realize the tremendous diffi-
culty in preventing smuggling by sea and attempted to expand the
power of the Revenue Cutter Service to stem the tide against the
influx of contraband articles. In any event, there was no require-
ment that, prior to boarding, there be probable cause to believe that
a violation of United States laws had occurred or was occurring.
The immediate predecessor to 19 U.S.C. section 1581 was sec-
tion 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930.4 This section combined the broad-
est provisions from all the prior boarding statutes:
Officers of the customs or of the Coast Guard, and agents or
other persons authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, or
appointed for that purpose in writing by a collector may at any
time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the
United States or within four leagues of the coast of the United
States, without as well as within their respective districts, to
examine the manifest and to inspect, search and examine the
vessel or vehicle, and every part thereof, and any person, trunk
or package on board, and to this end to hail and stop such vessel
or vehicle, if under way, and use all necessary force to compel
compliance, and if it shall appear that any breach or violation of
the laws of the United States has been committed, whereby or in
consequence of which such vessel or vehicle, or the merchandise,
or any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel or
vehicle is liable to forfeiture, it shall be the duty of such officer
to make seizure of the same, and to arrest . . . any person en-
gaged in such breach or violation."
This statute broadened still further the power of customs offi-
cers in that it deleted the reasonable suspicion standard s5. for vehi-
cles. Once again the boarding and searching could be conducted
without any requirement of an appearance of wrongdoing. The stat-
ute was also broad enough to cover mere possession, as opposed to
1 Stat. 668 (1799)).
83. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
84. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930). This act repealed the Tariff Act
of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (1922). The language of section 581 in both acts was identical.
85. Id.
85.1 See notes 78 & 81 supra.
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importation, of contraband articles if such was in violation of the
law.
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, real-
ized the extent of the discretionary power conferred upon the Reve-
nue Cutter Service. In his first letter of regulations in 1790 he stated
in part:
While I recommend in the strongest terms to the respective offi-
cers, activity, vigilance and firmness, I feel no less solicitude that
their deportment may be marked with prudence, moderation and
good temper. Upon these last qualities, not less than the former,
must depend the success, usefulness and consequently continu-
ance of the establishment in which they are included. They can-
not be insensible that there are some prepossessions against it,
that the charge with which they are entrusted is a delicate one,
and that it is easy by mismanagement to produce serious and
extensive clamour, disgust and alarm.
They will keep in mind that their countrymen are free men,
and, as such, are impatient of everything that bears the least
mark of domineering spirit. They will, therefore, refrain, with the
most guarded circumspection, from whatever has the appearance
of haughtiness, rudeness, or insult."
There was very little said about any of the statutes forming the
basis for 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) and 14 U.S.C. section 89(a) 7
until after the Supreme Court decided Carroll v. United States88 in
1925. Then, a series of cases in the lower federal courts challenged
the authority of statutory predecessors to section 1581(a).11 Almost
all of the cases dealt with the smuggling of liquor during the prohibi-
tion era.
In 1926, the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated:
It is evident that the [vessel] was loaded with a cargo intended
to be introduced into the United States by those on board. This
could be done by the use of small boats after arriving within a
convenient distance from the coast as well as by sailing into a
harbor and there unloading on lighters or at a wharf. When she
reached a point within four leagues of the shore she was as much
86. UNITED STATES COAST GuARD BOARDING MANUAL 1-1 (CG-253, 1972).
87. Since the two major Supreme Court cases regarding the fourth amendment were not
decided until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it is probable that the author-
ity to board vessels without probable cause was never questioned or if it was that the conten-
tions were summarily dismissed.
88. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also notes 138-41 and accompanying text infra.
89. Specifically, these were section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858
and later, section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590. The latter superseded
the former and was subsequently codified as 19 U.S.C. § 481.
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within the jurisdiction of the United States as if actually in port,
and was required to observe all the customs laws and regulations.
When the Coast Guard observed her at anchor they had the au-
thority to board her for the purpose of making inquiry as to her
cargo and destination, and finding no manifest, had the right to
search without the necessity of procuring a search warrant. Find-
ing probable cause therefore, the seizure was justified."
This decision left unanswered the question of authority to search if
a manifest had been present, but the initial boarding and inquiries
were apparently presumed valid without the necessity that the ves-
sel was suspected of smuggling. The only requirement was that the
seizure be justified by probable cause. In essence, this allowed the
Coast Guard to board and develop probable cause for seizure.
A year later the Supreme Court decided Maul v. United States9
and United States v. Lee.92 Maul held that the Coast Guard could
seize an American vessel on the high seas beyond twelve miles if the
vessel was subject to forfeiture for a violation of the United States
revenue. laws. In Lee this was expanded so that the Coast Guard had
the authority to board, search, and seize an American vessel on the
high seas beyond twelve miles when probable cause existed to be-
lieve United States law was being violated. The latter situation was
analogized to the search and seizure of automobiles as allowed by
Carroll. The Court reasoned that since the seizure was proper, the
search was authorized by section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922.
In United States v. 63 Kegs of Malt 3 and The Mistinguette94
forfeiture proceedings were based upon discovery of unmanifested
cargo aboard British schooners. The Second Circuit assumed the
validity of the boarding and search. The issue in each case was
whether a manifest was required because the vessel was bound for
the United States. The court held that probable cause to believe the
vessel was bound for the United States was required in order to
seize.
90. The Island Home, 13 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1926) (citations omitted).
91. 274 U.S. 501 (1927). See notes 48-54 and accompanying text supra.
92. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
93. 27 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1928).
94. 27 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1928).
95. See also Gillam v. United States, 27 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1928). In a district court
opinion in the same year, The Pescawha, no mention was made of probable cause to board.
A Coast Guard vessel, while searching for survivors of a sinking vessel, observed the Pescawha
headed away from the coast under full sail approximately 6.6 miles from the coast. For
reasons not explained, the Coast Guard officer considered the vessel suspicious and inter-
cepted it to determine identity, purpose, and destination. Upon boarding he determined that
the vessel was carrying a large quantity of liquor with no manifest and accordingly seized the
cargo. The court stated there was a fair inference that the vessel was attempting to escape
and that this justified pursuit. 45 F.2d 221 (D. Ore. 1928).
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In 1929 the Second Circuit decided the case of The Newton
Bay" wherein an anchored British vessel had been sighted eight and
one half miles from the coast. Upon approach by the Coast Guard
the vessel had turned off its lights and maneuvered erratically. The
Coast Guard pursued the vessel and fired two blanks. The vessel
stopped and was boarded. All of these events transpired more than
twelve miles from the coast. The subsequent search uncovered un-
manifested liquor. The vessel's papers had indicated it was suppos-
edly on a voyage which would have kept it 250 miles away from the
coast. The court found that the actions of the vessel confirmed the
intent to introduce its cargo unlawfully into the United States:
[tiherefore authority for the Coast Guard officers to board this
vessel, found within four leagues of the coast, and to search and
examine it, or any part thereof, and to use all necessary force to
compel compliance, is found in section 581 of the Tariff Act of
1922. . . .9
The statutory authority was cited to sustain the pursuit of the vessel
outside the twelve mile customs waters, but the court implied that
once a reasonable suspicion arose that the foreign vessel was "bound
for the United States" the statute was applicable without suspicion
that unmanifested contraband was aboard. The court apparently
recognized the necessity of boarding in order to inspect the mani-
fest.
From 1930 to 1931 several circuits were presented with cases
involving the validity of boardings and searches under section
1581(a)'s predecessors. They either assumed probable cause was not
required or stated it was not necessary." However, a different result
was reached by the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Fish v. Brophy.99 When presented with a case involving the
boarding and search of a private pleasure craft in New York Bay,
the court stated:
96. 36 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1929).
97. 36 F.2d at 731.
98. Alksne v. United States, 39 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1930). Citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1885), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), the court
refused to suppress evidence obtained during a customs inspection without mention of proba-
ble cause. See also Await v. United States, 47 F.2d 477, 477-78 (3d Cir. 1931) ("19 U.S.C.A.
§ 481 . . . authorizes officers of the Coast Guard to go on board of any vessel at any place
within the United States or within four leagues of the coast . . . without the necessity of
establishing probable cause or procuring a search warrant."); The Metmuzel, 49 F.2d 368 (4th
Cir. 1931) (discussing the validity of a seizure without discussing probable cause for board-
ing).
99. 52 F.2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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Section 581 of the act of 1922, title 19, U.S.C.A., § 481, undoubt-
edly gave defendant the right to stop boats in New York Harbor
to examine their manifests. But manifests are required only in
the case of vessels "arriving in the United States" with cargo from
foreign ports. . . . In the instant case, defendant states no facts
which would justify a belief that plaintiff's boat, a pleasure craft,
was carrying a cargo from a foreign port into the United States.10
The judge in this case appears to have been applying a border search
rationale similar to the one being employed in the recent cases
construing section 1581(a). However, the issue was phrased solely in
terms of whether probable cause to believe the pleasure boat was
being used in violation of the law was required; and, therefore, the
case would seem to require probable cause for a yacht even in a
border crossing situation.1'
Fish was cited as authority for a probable cause requirement in
United States v. Coppolo.10 2 While patrolling the entrance to Am-
brose Channel a Coast Guard officer sighted a fishing vessel entering
the harbor. After boarding, the skipper of the fishing boat stated
that the vessel was loaded with scallops. The Coast Guard officer,
claiming a right to investigate, opened the hatches to the hold and
discovered a cargo of liquor. There was no probable cause to believe
the vessel was engaged in smuggling. Responding to the govern-
ment's claim of section 581 authority, the court stated that the
protection of the fourth and fifth amendments extended to boats.
In refusing to give weight to the dicta in Maul v. United States and
by distinguishing United States v. Lee, Gillam v. United States,
United States v. Hayes and The Island Home, the court was able
to agree that probable cause was required to search the vessel. The
court first stated:
A government officer has the right to board a vessel to inspect the
manifest and observe the cargo, and if, from this investigation,
it is apparent that a crime is being committed in his presence,
by reason of what he can see, or by reason of the failure of the
master to produce a manifest, or an incomplete or improper
100. Id. at 200.
101. United States v. Hayes, 52 F.2d 977 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) assumed probable cause to
be required for boarding, searching and seizing a yacht in territorial waters under the provi-
sions of the National Prohibition Act and found that probable cause had existed. However,
the judge stated in dicta that probable cause was not a prerequisite, under section 581 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, for the Coast Guard boarding to inspect for any violation of navigation,
tariff, or other laws of the United States. The judge also recognized a distinction between the
border crossing limitation for searches without probable cause with regard to vehicles and the
boarding authority with regard to vessels. 52 F.2d at 978.
102. 2 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.J. 1932).
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manifest, or other apparent violation of the navigation or revenue
laws, he would have the right to arrest the offender and seize and
search the vessel.
1 3
In other jurisdictions where probable cause is not required for the
initial intrustion, this series of steps would justify a much more
intrusive search, as the relevant facts supporting probable cause to
believe a violation was being committed became apparent. But the
language above also would justify the instant search. Incongruously
the court continued:
In the instant case no such violation was proven, for, as the proof
goes, there was nothing in the appearance of the vessel, or the
surrounding circumstances, to indicate that it was violating any
United States law. The violation was discovered only upon the
opening of the hatches and the making of an exploratory search. 04
The Second Circuit has recognized the practical difficulty of
distinguishing between boarding to find a violation of prohibition
laws and boarding to find a violation of customs laws. In The
Atlantic,'"5 a Coast Guard officer observed the vessel riding low in
the water and eventually boarded while the vessel was underway
due to its failure to stop when signalled to do so. Upon boarding he
smelled alcohol, entered the pilot house to demand the ship's papers
and saw the liquor in the engine room. The court indicated that
[t]he authorization of § 581 is to ascertain whether there are any
103. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
104. Id. Accord, United States v. Powers, 1 F. Supp. 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1932). A Coast Guard
officer approached a fishing vessel of a class known to smuggle liquor by using a double
bottom. Noting that the vessel appeared to be loaded, the officer boarded, inspected the
ship's papers and asked permission to check the hold. The officer took measurements which
indicated a high probability that the vessel had a double bottom but he could not find any
concealed hatch. The officer left and then reboarded and without consent searched the hold
and located the entrance to the double bottom, thereby discovering a cargo of liquor. Citing
Hayes and Fish, the court first found that the boarding was conducted for the purpose of
detecting a prohibition violation and not for detecting a customs or shipping law violation
and since the officer "suspected that the [vessel] had a cargo of intoxicating liquors, and
that was the only excuse for [his] actions, [he] could not board the [vessel] in the absence
of probable cause .. " 1 F. Supp. at 460.
But see United States v. 146,157 Gallons of Alcohol, 3 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1933).
Although the court made a distinction between an in rem and a criminal proceeding, the court
stated that customs officers may exercise the right of boarding for the purpose of enforcing
navigation laws as well as customs laws. See also The America, 4 F. Supp. 775 (E.D.N.Y.
1933) where a moored, unattended fishing vessel, listing to starboard was boarded by a Coast
Guard officer. In the engine room he found a small quantity of fish and ice stored equally on
each side of the boat. Upon cutting a hole in the deck of the engine room he discovered
contraband liquor. The judge indicated that 19 U.S.C. § 1581 gave full authority to board
and that the actual search was not unreasonably conducted since nothing visible at the time
of boarding and search of the engine room accounted for the listing.
105. 68 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1933).
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dutiable articles concealed in the vessel; it is not to discover acts
of criminality. If by chance contraband merchandise or dutiable
articles are discovered, then the Coast Guard officer must arrest
any person connected with the smuggling of such merchan-
dise. . . . Nor is this right of stoppage and search confined to
commercial vessels. It also applies to vessels that might be classi-
fied as "private" or "pleasure."'' 6
The court stated that it need only decide whether the officers had
legal power to board the vessel and inspect her license, 107 since the
exercise of that authority precipitated the incidental discovery of
the contraband. However, apparently attempting to settle the issue
with regard to section 581 once and for all, the court went on to
explain the rationale behind the statute:
[T]o effectuate the provisions of the navigation and tariff
laws and to protect the revenue of the United States, Congress,
by § 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930, enables officers of the Coast
Guard to board and search any vessel within the territorial waters
of the United States in order to examine the vessels for identifica-
tion and to discover whether they have arrived from a foreign port
and to see that they observe the quarantine and health laws and,
comprehensively, all the laws of the United States. . . .A search
of a vessel by officers of the Coast Guard or of the customs for
the purpose of discovering a cargo which might be subject to duty
should not be regarded as unreasonable even though the search,
as distinguished from the seizure, is made without probable
cause. 18
In spite of the qualification that this authority be applied within the
territorial waters, this was the broadest construction given to the
statute by any circuit. It also clearly distinguished search from sei-
zure for purposes of requiring probable cause. United States v.
Wischerth"° further implemented this theory. Chasing a vessel into
New York harbor, a Coast Guard officer finally boarded and exam-
ined the papers which licensed it as a fishing yacht. Upon checking
below the officer discovered contraband liquors. The court stated
that probable cause to board, search and seize was not required. The
vessel had violated the navigation laws by violating the conditions
of her license by engaging in a trade other than that for which she
was licensed.""
106. Id. at 9.
107. The Second Circuit indicated that the power to board and inspect a license applied
to inbound, outbound, foreign vessels, domestic vessels, and vessels which have never left
United States waters. 68 F.2d at 10.
108. 68 F.2d at 10.
109. 68 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1933).
110. See also The Thorndyke, 67 F.2d 198 (3d Cir. 1933), whichassumes the validity of
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IV. A FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The Constitution never has been a rigid series of regulations.
Rather, it was created as a set of flexible guidelines to be molded
to the mores of a changing society. This is true even though the
fourth amendment was created to be a protection against a specific
abuse of power-the use of general warrants in a commercial set-
ting.1 '
In 1662, the British Parliament had passed a statute similar to
the present day United States statutes 14 U.S.C. section 89(a) and,
especially, 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a). The British enactment had
authorized the examination of ships, vessels and persons on board
to find articles sought to be imported or exported without appropri-
ate duties having been paid. Officers were also empowered to visit
and search places of concealment such as warehouses and a "writ
of assistance""' 2 could be used in the enforcement procedure." 3 As
late as 1761, the colonists were being subjected to these general
warrant searches and by that time their use was well known and was
being vigorously denounced. Subsequently, cases in England out-
lawed the use of general warrants. The separate American colonies
seized the opportunity to provide against unreasonable searches and
seizures in their declaration of rights."'
Before Congress acted on the Proposed Bill of Rights, it passed
the Act of July 31, 1789" 5 authorizing searches of ships without
warrants and searches of houses with warrants. After the Bill of
Rights was submitted to the states, Congress enacted the New
Collection Act providing for warrantless, "mere suspicion" searches
the statutory authority to board and search. Between the mid-1930s and the decision of
Almeida-Sanchez in 1973, very few cases appear to have argued the validity of searches
conducted under the authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Those cases involving application of
the statute seem to assume the validity of boarding and searching without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. E.g. The Peublos, The Monalola, The Choctows, 77 F.2d 618, 620 (2d
Cir. 1935); United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1962); Compania Naviera
Vascongada v. United States, 354 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1966).
111. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, Part One, 3 U. RiCH. L. REv. 278, 293-94 (1969).
112. The "writ of assistance" issued from the Court of Exchequer to the sheriff com-
manding his assistance to government collectors.
113. Stengel, supra note 111, at 294.
114. Id. at 295.
115. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 authorized designated officers
to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods,
wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search
for, seize, and secure any such goods ...and if they shall have cause to suspect
a concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other
place, they ... shall .. .be entitled to a warrant .. .to search for such
goods. . . .(emphasis supplied).
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of vessels."' This suggests that the fourth amendment made few
changes in the search and seizure procedures being practiced at the
time with regard to vessels."7 The founders of our Constitution ap-
peared to be concerned with overreaching warrants and not with
warrantless searches justified by situations where the requirement
of obtaining a warrant would create a delay that would frustrate the
purpose of the search. These warrantless searches, however, had to
be kept within reasonable bounds and the Court's struggle with this
concept has led at least one commentator to suggest that the Court's
emphasis on a warrant requirement has "stood the amendment on
its head.""' 8 The merit of this contention, and the theoretical base
for present day application of the fourth amendment to searches at
sea, will be examined through a brief historical review of the major
Supreme Court decisions relating to searches and seizures.
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." 9
The Amendment's basic purpose is to restrict searches by the gov-
ernment that invade individual privacy but, by its language, it does
allow some searches.'12 An early Supreme Court case which gave
116. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790). See generally Section III, STATUTORY ANALYSIS supra.
The fourth amendment was subsequently proclaimed on December 15, 1791.
117. Congress later enacted the Act of 25 April 1808, ch. 66, § 7, 2 Stat. 501, authorizing
specified officers to detain any vessel when they had reason to suspect the vessel would violate
embargo provisions. The Supreme Court, in Crowell v. McFaddon, 12 U.S. 94 (1814), ac-
cepted Congress' dictates, answering a probable cause argument by stating the "law places
a confidence in the opinion of the officer ... " id. at 98. A year earlier the Court had defined
probable cause for a seizure as cause that "imports a seizure made under circumstances which
warrant suspicion." Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 347 (1813).
118. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 47 (1969). The author
argues that this has led to several harmful consequences: (1) it has fostered a "belief that
most searches are and should be covered by warrants, when in fact most [cannot bel"; (2)
it has induced an "oversimplified, if not erroneous notion that warranted searches are better";
and (3) it has pushed legislators toward a misconception "that the cure for the evils of search
and seizure is more warrants." Id.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
120. Whether the wording indicates that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se
or whether the warrant requirement only applies to searches that would be unreasonable
without a warrant is cause for speculation. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment
42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47-48 (1974). Since there is no doubt that 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) and 19
U.S.C. § 1581(a) deal with searches and seizures as contemplated under the Constitution and
that they have the requisite relationship to "persons, houses, papers and effects," these areas
will not be discussed.
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effect to the fourth amendment was Boyd v. United States.'' In
holding unconstitutional an act of Congress requiring a defendant
in a revenue case to produce his private books, invoices and papers
in court or to suffer the consequences that the allegations against
him would be considered as true, the Court pointed out that even
the writs of assistance did not allow for such searches and seizures.
In distinguishing a search through a person's private papers from a
search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to
payment of duties, the Court stated that:
The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government
is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and
the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or
concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been author-
ized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the
like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from
the commencement of the government. The first statute passed
by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the Act of July
31, 1789, (1 St. 43), contains provisions to this effect. As this act
was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption
the original amendments. . . it is clear that the members of that
body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
"unreasonable," and they are not embraced within the prohibi-
tion of the amendment.' 2
The enactments of 1790 would fall within this same construction of
the amendment. Not being unreasonable by reason of history or
Congressional dictate, they are outside fourth amendment proscrip-
tions.
In applying fourth amendment proscriptions to invalidate the
stop, search and seizure of an automobile in Carroll v. United
States, "3 the Court reiterated the Boyd rationale referring to the
1789 statutory language, but emphasized that there the statutory
language had required "reason to suspect" a violation. This necess-
ity, the Court felt, disposed of any warrant requirement. Apparently
recognizing that later statutes had eliminated that language, the
Court shifted to a different analysis to reach a requirement of proba-
ble cause. In quoting section 970 of the Revised Statutes'24 which
states that the seizing officer is immune from liability when the
121. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
122. Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
123. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
124. Comp. Stat. § 1611, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. 638. The provisions of section 970
are identical to those of ch. 5 § 36, 1 Stat. 47 (1789). See note 75 supra.
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claimant wins the forfeiture proceeding if there was reasonable
cause for the seizure, the Court stated:
It follows from this that, if an officer seizes an automobile or the
liquor in it without a warrant, and the facts as subsequently
developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation and forfei-
ture, the officer may escape costs or a suit for damages by a
showing that he had reasonable or probable cause for the seizure.
The measure of legality of such a seizure is, thorefore, that the
seizing officer shall have reagon or probable cau5e for believing
that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband
liquor therein which is being illegally transported. 5
Thus, the Court moved the dispositive instant from post actual
seizure, when sufficient facts might well have developed to have
retroactively justified the initial intrusion, to a point prior to the
stop. From a historical viewpoint it is not clear that this was ever
the intent of Congress, especially in situations involving stops at sea
where such facts are almost impossible to discern prior to boarding.
Although the Court has returned to reasonableness as the ultimate
standard, 6 warrantless searches are still considered to be narrow
exceptions to the fourth amendment. Except in a narrowly re-
stricted set of search situations, probable cause is the benchmark
for reasonableness of warrantless searches." 7
Prior to Katz v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court commonly
used the concept of a "constitutionally protected area" to limit the
scope of the fourth amendment's protection. Since that decision,
however, a "privacy" concept has been used, which still remains
largely undefined.'29 All government control of human behavior is an
invasion of privacy and the government may intrude on that privacy
only if there is a special need. Privacy is not a good held at the
125. 267 U.S. at 155-56 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950).
127. This appears to be a consistently applied governing principle. Hard and fast lines
have been drawn around each of the major exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (auto searches); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (exigent circumstan-
ces); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest).
128. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
129. At least three facets have been revealed: (1) the right of the individual to be free in
his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion; (2) the right of an individual
not to have his private affairs made public by the government; and (3) the right of an
individual to be free in action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental compul-
sion. None of these is absolute. Kurland, The Private 1, THE UNIV. OF CHIcAGO MAG. 7, 8,
Autumn 1976.
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pleasure of the government. It is a concept at the very foundation
of freedom, and yet this must be balanced against the reality of
societal interchange and societal preservation-interests which war-
rant intrusions into this privacy. 1 ' For this reason, searches and
seizures affecting protected interests are limited by the fourth
amendment only if they are unreasonable. In United States v.
Rabinowitz, 3' the Court emphasized that the definition of reason-
ableness was extremely elastic, but the Court has since hardened
the line of demarcation.' Furthermore, should the Court decide
that a search in particular circumstances is reasonable without a
warrant or probable cause, it is necessary to insure that the actual
search is not made in an abusive, unduly intrugive manner.'" Gen-
erally, the rules governing the scope and manner of searches are
based on objective criteria since subjective considerations are
thought to allow too much discretion and eventually lead to abusive
searching techniques.
Although there have been hints that the Supreme Court may
be shifting from the present "all or nothing" model of the fourth
amendment,'34 the simplicity of that analysis sustains it as the cur-
rent standard.'35 The fourth amendment protects against invasions
of privacy, and this decision with regard to interests to be protected
rests upon value judgments which are difficult to achieve through
the balancing process, since there are always competing interests.
"The ultimate question . .. is whether, if the particular form of
surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated
by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom
remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsist-
ent with the aims of a free and open society."'' The primary concern
130. Id. at 8-13, 36; Comment, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6
U. MicH. J. oF L. REF. 154, 176-78 (1972).
131. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
132. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The broader, elastic view retains vitality as evinced by Justice
White's dissent in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 289 (1973). See also
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 358-60 (1974).
133. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973); Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395
U.S. 814 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
134. E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
135. Amsterdam, supra note 132, at 389-91. The question of what constitutes a covered
search therefore must be viewed from the perspective that removal from fourth amendment
restrictions removes it from judicial control. The author suggests that a "sliding scale" ap-
proach placing all searches within the fourth amendment's protection to varying degrees
would be too complex to control since the validity of each search would be dependent on its
particular set of circumstances.
136. Id. at 403. The author suggests that police discretion to conduct searches be con-
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is against unjustified and arbitrary searches and seizures. For this
reason, the characteristics of those searches completely justifiable
without warrants must be compared to the characteristics of those
searches conducted under the auspices of general warrants and must
be deemed unreasonable if there is no principled basis for distin-
guishing them from general warrants.'37
V. ANALOGOUS AREAS OF THE LAW OF SEARCHES
Since the Supreme Court is extremely reluctant to expand the
categories of warrantless searches, it is necessary to summarize
these exceptions to the fourth amendment and enumerate their
characteristics for comparison to searches and seizures at sea. The
doctrines analogous to searches and seizures made under the au-
thority of 14 U.S.C. section 89(a) or 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) can
be broadly classified as: (1) automobile searches encompassing the
mobility and exigent circumstances exceptions; (2) administrative
searches; and (3) border searches involving enforcement of customs,
immigration and national security laws. The secondary doctrines of
plain view, inevitable discovery, founded suspicion and collateral
searches will be discussed in the context of these three classifica-
tions.
A. Automobile Searches
The automobile exception stems primarily from Carroll v.
United States,138 Chambers v. Maroney,139 and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire.,0" Carroll held that if there was probable cause to be-
lieve that the car contained contraband or weapons endangering the
police, and if exigent circumstances made it impractical to procure
a warrant in the course of reasonable investigation, then a warrant
was unnecessary.' Chambers appeared to ignore the exigent cir-
cumstances requirement of Carroll in allowing a warrantless search
of a car based on probable cause, despite the circumstances sur-
rounding the search. However, the Coolidge Court in discussing the
necessary elements of the plain view exception,' defined a justifi-
fined by legislation or police-made rules and regulations, subject to judicial review for reason-
ableness and that the exclusionary rule be flexibly administered to insure compliance.
137. Id. at 411.
138. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
139. 339 U.S. 42 (1970).
140. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
141. 267 U.S. at 153-54.
142. In order to fall within the "plain view" exception the evidence must have been
seized pursuant to circumstances which show that: (1) the initial intrusion affording the
"plain view" must have been lawful; (2) the discovery of the incriminating evidence must
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able initial intrusion as one founded on the dual Carroll require-
ments. The trend is to expand the "exigent circumstances" defini-
tion. A variety of circumstances qualify, such as location of the
vehicle and its condition, proximity of persons in control of the
vehicle to the car at the time of the search, and practicability of
obtaining a warrant. Exigent circumstances are evaluated at the
time of the initial intrusion. Cases involving the plain view excep-
tion to strict standards of probable cause permit searches based
upon reasonable suspicion or exigent circumstances. Ordinary prob-
able cause requirements are softened when an overriding public
necessity makes an intrusion permissible based on a lesser quantum
of fact.' Cady v. Dombrowski' exemplifies this approach. Two
and one half hours after the driver of a car had been arrested for
drunken driving and his car left seven miles from the police station,
another officer made a thorough search and found bloodied items
which led to the driver's conviction for murder. The search was
sustained by extrapolation from a number of theories, but plain
view doctrine was the primary basis. The initial intrusion was justi-
fied by reference to the ambulatory character of the car, the unique
role that the local police play with regard to automobile regulation
and public safety, the standardization of the procedures used, and
the fact that the searching policeman had no knowledge of any
murder investigation being conducted. Parallel to this relaxation of
intrusion standards is the doctrine of "founded suspicion" enunci-
ated by the Ninth Circuit in the case of Wilson v. Porter.'45 The
court justified a less than probable cause stop and subsequent
search of a vehicle, on the ground that the officer had a "founded
suspicion" that the driver might be engaged in criminal activity.
tinder this doctrine, the subsequent investigation may lead to prob-
able cause to believe the driver has engaged in criminal activity,
thus justifying the eventual arrest, search and seizure. The doctrine
have been inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence must have been
immediately apparent. For a discussion of the evolution of the plain view doctrine see Com-
ment, Constitutional Standards for Applying the Plain View Doctrine, 6 ST. MARY'S L. J. 725
(1974).
143. For excellent discussions of the mobility exception to fourth amendment require-
ments and its interplay with the plain view doctrine see Farquhar, Lieb and Vogel, Criminal
Procedure 1973-1974 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 379, 379-401; Simka, Collateral Search: A Survey
of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 21 S. DAK. L. REV. 254, 258-61, 269-71 (1976);
Comment, Back on the Road Again-The Mobility Exception in the 70's, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
550 (1974).
144. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
145. 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). The doctrine is analyzed in Weisgall, Stop, Search and
Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 219 (1974).
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is analogous to that of "stop and frisk"'45 and forms the basis from
which a court can determine that the initial detention was neither
arbitrary nor harrassing. As with stop and frisk, the test of reason-
ableness should be partly objective in that the circumstances at the
moment of search or seizure should lead a reasonable man to con-
clude that the action taken was appropriate; and partly subjective
since the officer's conclusions in light of his experience that criminal
activity may have been taking place should also help justify the
stop. 1
47
The two remaining categories deal not only with warrantless
searches but also with searches that do not require probable cause
or require only a diluted probable cause standard. The rationales in
these areas are closely related to searches at sea. The Coast Guard
conducts safety inspections of vessels under the auspices of 14
U.S.C. section 89(a) which are closely akin to administrative
searches upheld by the Court, and customs inspection within twelve
miles of the United States coast under the auspices of 19 U.S.C.
section 1581(a) which are closely akin to the border searches sus-
tained by the Court.
B. Administrative Searches
Frank v. Maryland'48 held that administrative housing inspec-
tions were not searches and therefore were without the protection
of the fourth amendment. This "all or nothing" rationale was aban-
doned in Camara v. Municipal Court'49 and See v. Seattle."'5 These
administrative searches fall within the fourth amendment and re-
quire the use of the warrant procedure,'' but the probability re-
quirement is modified. The administrative inspection warrant could
issue despite the absence of probable cause to believe that a viola-
146. The law of stop and frisk is developed in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The intrusion
is sustained if the officer is "able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 392
U.S. at 21.
147. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 30 (1968).
148. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
149. 387 U.S. 533 (1967).
150. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See extended the rationale of Camara, relating to private
houses, to commercial establishments.
151. At this point the Court felt that the warrant requirement could only be dispensed
with in searches pursuant to consent or exigent circumstances, or a crossing of the border.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (search of premises following hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(searches of the person to prevent loss of evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
154 (1925) (border searches).
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tion had occurred provided there was valid statutory authority for
the inspection. Once the need for regulation was determined to be
a valid government interest, reasonable legislative standards met
the probable cause requirement for issuance of the warrants. The
necessity of warrantless non-probable cause administrative searches
was briefly addressed by the Court in Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States'2 and extensively treated in United States v.
Biswell. "I In the former, the Court sustained a warrantless non-
probable cause inspection of a liquor store because that industry
had historically been highly regulated by Congress, and Congress
had had broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for
searches with regard to the industry. Biswell extended the
Colonnade rationale to include the firearms industry. Apparently
relying on a theory of implied consent, the Court decided that a
dealer in the pervasively regulated firearms business operated with
knowledge that his records, firearms and ammunition would be sub-
ject to effective inspections. The Court said: "We have little diffi-
culty in concluding that where, as here, regulatory inspections fur-
ther urgent federal interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the
threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection
may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by
statute."'' 4 The concealability and portability of the items to be
inspected and the concomitant potential for frustrating the inspec-
tion were cited as practical justifications for this exception to
Camara and See. Although there were criminal penalties involved
in Biswell, it appears that the Court is making a distinction between
administrative and criminal searches. 5' An administrative search
implies a routine inspection of a morally neutral class of persons in
order to secure compliance with various regulations. A criminal
search has focused on an individual suspected 6f involvement in
criminal actions. When an administrative search encompasses non-
compliance with regulations punishable by criminal sanctions, more
152. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
153. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
154. 406 U.S. at 317. The crucial Biswell factors appear to be: (1) the inspection was
specifically authorized by statute; (2) the inspection was carefully limited in time, place and
scope; (3) the inspection was conducted in furtherance of an urgent federal interest; (4) the
inspection concerned an area where there was a limited expectation of privacy; (5) such
inspections were required for enforcement of a pervasive regulatory system; (6) there was only
a slight possibility of abuse of the power authorized; and (7) the licensing scheme authorizing
such searches was sufficiently pervasive to give the manager notice as to the purpose and
limitations of the inspection.
155. See also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding the right to require home
visits, without procuring warrants, by case workers for individuals seeking government mone-
tary aid). The Court noted that no criminal penalty was invoked by refusal to permit the visit.
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stringent fourth amendment standards may be required.'56 To date
the Court appears willing to balance the reasonableness of the intru-
sion against the overriding governmental interest and is disposed to
uphold the admissibility of discovered evidence if the good faith
efforts of the administrative officers in carrying out the purposes of
the regulatory scheme are apparent.'57
C. Border Searches
The lower federal courts appear to be confining the authority
of 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) to the border search rationale. However,
the Supreme Court has only spoken directly to the issue of border
searches in the context of vehicles, not vessels, and in the context
of immigration laws, not customs enforcement statutes. The factors
limiting the border search doctrine may or may not be applicable
to all searches at sea.
The term "border search" applies to searches for contraband
and aliens unlawfully entering the country. The customs inspections
considered by the courts to date have been held to be subject to the
fourth amendment's constraint against unreasonable searches, but
the scope of reasonableness has been found to be broader in the
border search context because of a nation's right to self preserva-
tion.5 8 Furthermore, with regard to searches of international travel-
ers at the border, the Court has not deemed it appropriate to define
reasonableness in the confining terms of either a warrant or proba-
ble cause requirement. The power to institute customs enforcement
searches at national borders is well grounded in history and it ap-
pears that the Court is willing to accept that the mere fact of cross-
ing the border is sufficient grounds for a search.' 9 Through enact-
156. Rothstein and Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened
to Camara and See? 50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975). For further analysis of administrative
searches see Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and The Fourth Amendment: A
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1011
(1973). For analysis of the Biswell exception to other administrative searches see Comment,
The Validity of Warrantless Searches Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
44 U. Cui. L. REV. 105 (1974); Note, Warrantless Inspection Under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 42 GEo WASH. L. REv. 1089 (1974).
157. Simka, Collateral Search: A Survey of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 21
S. DAK. L. REV. 254, 269 (1976).
158. See Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 53 (1974); Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and
Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L L. AND POL. 93, 94 (1972).
159. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (dictum). Border searches are distinguishable from searches
pursuant to criminal investigations on three grounds: (1) since an individual crossing a border
belongs to a class whose members frequently violate certain laws in the process of entering,
the fact of his crossing is by itself some evidence that he may be violating some law; (2) since
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ment of the customs statutes, Congress has determined that the
individual right to privacy must yield extensively to an overriding
public interest. Although the authority of section 1581(a) is broad
enough to encompass searches of vehicles and persons carrying con-
traband at any place, it is the purpose of this comment to analyze
the statutory authority only in its grant of power to search vessels.
In the border search context, as with other searches, there are
two elements: initiation and conduct. The latter relates to the de-
gree of intrusion which is reasonable and, to the extent applicable
to this paper, will be discussed in the concluding section. More
important to present considerations are the two facets of initiation,
port of entry and extended border searches. The definitions of these
two terms may limit the opportunities for searches of vessels ir-
respective of statutory language.
The reasonableness of a border search is dependent on its prox-
imity to an international boundary. Within the area of the border
itself and a narrow customs barrier,""0 a general suspicion is all that
is required to institute a search. In this context, the border search
rationale has been extended to persons who have never actually
crossed an international boundary but who work within the customs
zone."' The courts, under pressure to give customs officials greater
authority to halt the flow of narcotics, have recognized the necessity
that some customs searches must take place away from the immedi-
ate border area,16 2 and they have created criteria which must be
satisfied to insure the reasonableness to such "extended"
searches.' 3 Recognizing that the power of a customs agent to search
the individual crossing a border is on notice that certain types of searches are likely to be
made, his expectation of privacy is lessened; and (3) since non-intrusive personal searches at
the border are administered to a class not deemed unworthy, such searches lack the quality
of insult felt by an individual singled out for a search. Note, Border Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 YALE L. J. 1007, 1012 (1968). The author argues that automatic exemption
of all border searches from the requirements of probable cause is not justified historically nor
on a policy basis. See also Comment, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth
Amendment, 10 ARIz. L. REv. 457 (1968), arguing that more than mere suspicion is required
for more than merely cursory searches since there is a greater danger of harassment with
intrusive searches.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
161. United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968).
162. The border is considered as an elastic concept rather than a static barrier, with its
elasticity dependent upon the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., United States v. Glaziou,
402 F.2d 8, 12 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Murgia v. United States,
285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961). See also, Recent Develop-
ments-Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure, 27 VAND. L. REv. 523, 525 (1974).
163. The validity of extended border searches has been sustained in United States v.
McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
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derives from the presumption that any contraband uncovered dur-
ing the search has been smuggled into the United States, Alexander
v. United States"'4 set forth the criteria necessary for a search away
from the border:
[The legality of the search must be tested by a determination
whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including
the time and distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent
of surveillance, are such to convince the fact finder with reason-
able certainty that any contraband which might be found in or
on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the
time of entry into the jurisdiction of the United States. 5
The key question to be asked is whether it was reasonably certain
that the contraband crossed the border or whether there was an
opportunity for the illegal goods to have been procured domesti-
cally.' 6 Within this concept the Fifth Circuit phrases the issue as
whether the circumstances known to the officer amount to a
"reasonable suspicion to believe that the customs laws [are] being
violated."'67 Thus, prior to Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, it
was clear that neither distance from the border nor time elapsed
since entry were in and of themselves the crucial factors."' Since the
searches were generally non-intrusive the courts focused on the
quantum of suspicion necessary to sustain the search.
In 1973 the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,'6 holding that probable cause was required for non-border
searches of cars conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's "roving patrols" looking for illegal aliens. 70 Noting that
the officers had not even satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard
of Terry v. Ohio' the Court stated:
It is not enough to argue . . . that the problem of deterring un-
lawful entry by aliens across long expanses of national boundaries
is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement stand in constant
tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual
164. 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
165. 362 F.2d at 382 (emphasis added).
166. See Note, Criminal Procedure-Search & Seizure-Aliens and "Extended" Border
Inspections, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1974).
167. United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1973). See also United States
v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970).
168. See, United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972); Alexander v. United
States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Vigil, 448 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970).
169. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
170. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
171. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the pre-
dictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to
constitutional safeguards.'72
The Court, in responding to the government's border search argu-
ment, directly recognized the validity of a true border search con-
ducted without probable cause or a warrant but stated that it must
take place at the actual border or a functional equivalent. Because
of this limitation the majority opinion followed the traditional war-
rantlegg goarch rationale and hold the automobile gearch excenption
inapplicable, since probable cause was required to stop the vehicle
and the court did not see fit to apply the administrative inspection
exception exemplified by Colonnade and Biswell. "I Justice Powell,
concurring,'74 argued that the use of area warrants authorized by
Camara and See 7' in this situation would effectively balance the
intrusiveness of the proposed search with the Government's interest
in conducting the search. These warrants, Justice Powell stated,
could be issued on a functional equivalent of probable cause to
preserve the flexibility of the immigration searches. The dissenters
would have given deference to congressional judgment. Relying on
the reasonableness standard of Cady v. Dombrowski,'70 the dissent'77
argued that all searches by the immigration officials were reason-
able in border regions with high concentrations of aliens. The
authorizing statute was thought to represent Congress's considered
judgment, in accordance with its duty to propose constitutionally
valid legislation, that proper enforcement of immigration laws in
border areas required random searches of vehicles without prob-
able cause or a warrant.'78 Thus the dissent would limit only the
extent of the search, circumscribing it with the bounds of reason-
ableness under the first clause of the fourth amendment.
Almeida-Sanchez has been extended in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce. '"I In the same areas where service officials are re-
stricted in searching, they are also limited in interrogating any alien
or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be in or to remain
in the United States. Referring specifically to Terry v. Ohio, 110 the
Court stated that the fourth amendment applies to all seizures of
172. 413 U.S. at 273.
173. Id. at 270-71.
174. 413 U.S. at 275-85.
175. See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text.
176. 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
177. Id. at 289.
178. Id. at 291.
179. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
180. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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persons including seizures short of arrest. Therefore, although prob-
able cause is not required, the officers must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, must reasonably warrant a belief
that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.''
Although the key problem in Almeida-Sanchez appeared to be
the unfettered discretion of a roving patrol, the rationale of that
decision was expanded to encompass fixed check point searches in
United States v. Ortiz.' 2 The government argued that non-border
fixed check point searches were less intrusive and less frightening
to motorists because of greater regularity and visibility. The Court
acknowledged this argument, but still found those protections insuf-
ficient, because the actual number of cars searched imported a de-
gree of discretion inconsistent with fourth amendment standards. "'
The language of these decisions establishes the principle that
only searches at the border or its functional equivalent can be con-
ducted without normal probable cause limitations upon police
power. Traditional probable cause standards now apply to all immi-
gration related searches outside of the privileged zone. The func-
tional equivalent question merely requires a court to ascertain
whether a substantial percentage of persons who reach a certain
point have crossed the border or have originated in the United
States."'
It appears that only four types of searches are exempt from a
probable cause requirement: consent searches, certain administra-
tive searches of highly regulated industries, the Terry protective
frisk for weapons, and border searches. The courts have struggled
181. 422 U.S. at 882. Further, the court stated:
[To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any
suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject
the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with
their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.
Id.
182. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
183. Id. at 896.
184. Fragomen, Searching for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service Encounters the
Fourth Amendment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 82, 107 (1975). For an excellent discussion of the
border search exception and Almeida-Sanchez and its progeny, see Friedman, Hashmall,
Hirsch, Criminal Procedure-The Border Patrol and the Fourth Amendment, 1976 ANN.
SURVEY OF AM. L. 148; Keller, Border Searches Revisited: The Constitutional Propriety of
Fixed and Temporary Checkpoint Searches, 2 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 251 (1975); Sutis, The
Extent of the Border, 1 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 235 (1974); Recent Developments-Constitutional
Law-Search and Seizure, 27 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1974); Note, The Aftermath of Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States: Automobile Searches for Aliens Take on a New Look, 10 CAL. WEs.
REv. 657 (1974).
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with these concepts in validating airport searches,' 5 and appear
likely to continue to attempt to force searches at sea into one of
these categories. Just as the courts have evinced a reluctance to
invalidate airport searches because of the important societal inter-
est in preventing air piracy, so have they evinced reluctance with
regard to searches at sea due to the strong interest in preventing
the smuggling of narcotics. Frequently, the doctrine of collateral
search becomes involved to sustain the actual discovery regardless
of the justification for the initial intrusion. When officers making a
legitimate search directed at a given offense discover circum-
stances which cause them to be suspicious about the commission of
an unrelated or remotely related crime, the validity of their actions
ultimately rests on a balancing of the extent of the intrusion of the
collateral search against the benefit to effective law enforcement
and the public welfare.'88 This collateral search doctrine is clearly
applicable to Coast Guard boardings under 14 U.S.C. section 89(a).
During the course of an administrative inspection it may become
apparent that there are violations of the customs laws. This problem
was also apparent in the Almeida-Sanchez case since the authority
of immigration officers to stop vehicles was far broader than the
correlative power of customs inspectors. However, the searches of
immigration officers frequently uncover contraband items. This
may have been one of the implicit reasons for the holding in
Almeida-Sanchez and is likely to cause problems for the courts
regarding boardings by the Coast Guard.
VI. IN THE WAKE OF ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ
A. Cases Attacking Searches Pursuant to 14 U.S. C. Section 89(a)
Some of the most recent attacks upon the boarding and search-
ing authority of the Coast Guard under Title 14, United States
Code, section 89(a) have been considered by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In United States v. Winter, "7 the Coast Guard had
boarded an American vessel 35 miles from Florida's coast and 11.9
185. See, Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and
Seizures, 62 Ky. L.J. 623 (1974). The key to admissibility of evidence found during airport
searches is: (1) whether the passengers boarding the aircraft were warned of the search and
had the opportunity to withdraw or consent to the search (see, e.g., United States v. Williams,
516 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973)); and
(2) whether the search was confined in scope and purpose to accomplish the intended ends
of the regulatory scheme of safeguarding passengers and aircraft, rather than to search for
evidence of a crime. Simka, Collateral Search: A Survey of Exceptions to the Warrant
Requirement, 21 S. DAK. L. REv. 254 (1976).
186. Simka, supra note 157, at 255.
187. 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975).
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miles from the nearest island of the Bahamas. The boarding officers
promptly located 1130 pounds of marijuana they knew to be on
board. The crew of the vessel, consisting of two Jamaicans, one
Bahamian, and two Americans was charged with conspiracy to im-
port a controlled substance into the United States. The defendants
challenged jurisdiction over the person and the crime and sought to
suppress the contraband, arguing the search was made in violation
of the fourth amendment. Prior surveillance and an informer's tips
had provided the knowledge that contraband was aboard. The court
assumed that the boarding and arrests were beyond the territorial
limits of the United States, but stated that this did not imply that
the circumstances were beyond the Coast Guard's jurisdiction to
arrest. Recognizing that the United States subscribes to the objec-
tive view of the territorial principle of jurisdiction,'88 the Fifth Cir-
cuit sustained jurisdiction over the offense, stating there was no
doubt that a conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws of the United
States existed. The court found it unnecessary to respond to appel-
lants' contentions as to jurisdiction over the person because "a de-
fendant in a federal criminal trial whether citizen or alien, whether
arrested within or beyond the territory of the United States may not
successfully challenge the District Court's jurisdiction over his per-
son on the grounds that his presence before the Court was unlaw-
fully secured."'89 The court ignored the fourth amendment claim
either presuming the validity of the statute or the existence of prob-
able cause.
The constitutionality of section 89(a) was again challenged in
United States v. Odom. 110 Defendants had appealed from a convic-
tion of conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute 6000 pounds of marijuana. A Coast Guard cutter, while
on a routine law enforcement patrol between Cuba and Mexico,
located a small craft heading north toward the United States. Upon
determining that the vessel was based in the United States, a board-
ing party visited the vessel to conduct a routine safety and docu-
mentation inspection. After checking the documentation papers
and safety equipment, the boarding officer noticed that the fishing
gear looked rusty and unused. When asked to open the hold for a
check of the main beam identification number, the crew was reluc-
188. 509 F.2d at 981. The objective view stipulates that jurisdiction extends over all acts
which take effect within the state even though the actors are not within that state's territorial
jurisdiction. See Richard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1967), and the cases
cited therein.
189. 509 F.2d at 985-86 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952)).
190. 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976).
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tant, stating that the hold was full of ice. Upon opening the hold
the boarding officer saw very little ice but did see several burlap
bags containing the subsequently seized marijuana. The govern-
ment argued that the search should be governed by border search
standards and that a reasonable suspicion existed to believe the
vessel was carrying contraband; that is, a vessel at sea, bound for
the United States, must cross the border to reach its destination and
that this connection with the border, even though 200 miles away,
was a much closer relationship than a car travelling one mile inside
the border. The court, realizing the significant limitations of this
argument, cited section 89(a) for the proposition that it allowed
boardings for administrative inspections. Once on board, circum-
stances became evident to support probable cause to search the
hold. This was as far as the court had to reason to sustain the
validity of the search and seizure of the marijuana.
In United States v. Hillstrom' defendants were convicted of
conspiracy to import marijuana. Coast Guard officers and customs
agents had arrested defendants aboard a sailing vessel of United
States ownership and registry while sailing in the Windward Pas-
sage between Cuba and Haiti. In sustaining the validity of the
search, the court stated that the Coast Guard officers had been on
board to conduct a safety and documentation inspection and that
while carrying out this inspection it had been necessary to dislodge
several bales of marijuana to ascertain the documentation number
on the frame of the vessel. Citing Odom, the court stated that the
Coast Guard was legitimately aboard under the statutory authority
of 14 U.S.C. Section 89(a). Since the initial intrusion was justified,
the subsequent discovery of the contraband in plain view was
valid.'92 The court intimated that even if the inspection had not
encompassed the necessary shifting of marijuana bales the plain
view doctrine may have been applicable because the vessel was not
licensed to carry any cargo. Even a prior suspicion that contraband
was aboard would not taint the validity of the safety inspection
under section 89(a).
The Fifth Circuit, relying on the aforementioned precedents,
specifically held 14 U.S.C. section 89(a) constitutional in United
States v. One Forty-Three Foot Sailing Vessel. 93 In so doing the
court adopted the district court's opinion.'94 The vessel, "Winds
191. 533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1976).
192. The court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971), for authority
for the plain view doctrine.
193. 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976).
194. United States v. One Forty-Three Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
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Will," was observed by a Coast Guard cutter near the Yucatan
Channel, proceeding without lights. Under the authority of sections
2 and 89(a) of Title 14, United States Code, the vessel was boarded
and checked for safety and fishery violations. Once on board, the
smell of marijuana was very strong and the boarding officer noticed
a large bag of grassy material in plain view in the galley. Subse-
quently, 2030 pounds of marijuana were found on board and the
United States brought a forfeiture proceeding against the vessel.
The district court's opinion first addressed the jurisdictional issue
posed by section 89(a)' 5 and concluded there was a right to board
and inspect the vessel and, if contraband was discovered, to seize
the vessel and cargo. The boarding and inspection were justified by
an international duty of the United States to exercise effective ad-
ministrative control over vessels flying its flag. The district court
stated that the inspection was limited to safety equipment and
administrative details and that a broad search into private papers
or personal belongings was not sought. The inspection was analog-
ized to those administrative inspections characterized by a high
governmental interest, such as the control of liquor or firearms.'"
The action by the Coast Guard was stated to be part of a systematic
enforcement of navigation and shipping laws and, once on board,
plain view and the strong smell of marijuana supplied the necessary
additional justification for a full search.'97
B. Cases Attacking Searches Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. Section
1581(a)
Generally, the courts have struggled to find alternate rationales
rather than to sustain searches solely under the blanket authority
conferred by section 1581(a). This may be because 19 U.S.C. section
1581, unlike 14 U.S.C. section 89(a), affords the same broad author-
ity to search vehicles ashore as is conferred to search vessels at sea.
In any event, the trend seems to be toward limitation of this author-
ity. Serious challenges to the constitutionality of searches con-
ducted under section 1581(a) have been made in the two circuits
encompassing the majority of the United States coastline-the Fifth
and the Ninth Circuits.
195. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra for a further discussion of jurisdic-
tional issues.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
197. Citing United States v. Byrd, 483 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1973), the district court stated
that the smell of marijuana alone would have justified the search.
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Arguing before the Ninth Circuit, the government urged the
applicability of section 1581(a), or, in the alternative, the rationale
of extended border search, to the facts in United States v. Solmes. "I
A customs agent had observed defendants take on board their
speedboat a large amount of fuel. Upon inquiry, the agent had
learned from the gas supplier that the supposed purpose of the trip
was to carry female guests to a Mexican island but the agent knew
from observation that no females were on board when the boat put
out to sea. A customs plane had observed a boat of similar descrip-
tion anchored off the Mexican coast. The following day the agent
had seen defendant back in San Diego and an hour later he had
found the speedboat docked in a marina with the bow riding low in
the water. Surveillance had been maintained until the boat was
pulled out of the water on a trailer the next day. The agent ap-
proached, requested a customs declaration, and when none was pro-
duced, he requested permission to search and found 819 pounds of
marijuana aboard. The Ninth Circuit upheld the search as a border
search at a functional equivalent of the border, analogizing the situ-
ation to the example of the nonstop plane flight arriving in St. Louis
from Mexico alluded to in Almeida-Sanchez. 1" The court stated:
Customs agents do not have carte blanche authority to search
aircraft arriving from points within the United States merely
because nonstop flights from foreign countries also land there. An
airport is a functional equivalent of the border only with respect
to those airplanes arriving from outside the United States.
Similarly, pursuant to the functional equivalency test ap-
plied here, the customs agents are not at liberty to search every
boat which enters Mission Bay. There are undoubtedly many
pleasure craft entering the bay daily which have not come from
foreign waters. A bay adjacent to an ocean is a functional equiva-
lent of a border only with respect to vessels which have traveled
in foreign waters before entry.00
The court went on to qualify this rationale by stating that a
finding that the vessel had actually crossed a border was not always
necessary, that continuous surveillance is not required at a func-
tional equivalent of the border, and that provided the vessel re-
mained docked until searched the border search need not be instan-
taneous upon arrival.20 The qualification as to actual border cross-
198. 527 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975).
199. 413 U.S. 266, 273. It is noteworthy that a search under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1970)
does not apply to airplanes since the statute only refers to vehicles and vessels which, as
defined in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a), (b) (1970), do not include aircraft.
200. 527 F.2d at 1372.
201. Id. at 1373 n.2.
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ing appears to be inconsistent with the decision's rationale although
the court may be allowing for situations wherein the search was
conducted outside of territorial waters when there would be reason.
able suspicion to believe the vessel or its cargo was destined to cross
the border.
In United States v. Jones02 the Ninth Circuit considered a
search by customs agents of a speedboat after it had put out to sea,
returned, and been loaded on a trailer and towed twenty miles.
Although the court found that there was consent for the search, the
government had argued for validity under section 1581(a) as an
extended border search. In response the court said: "Strict applica-
tion of the literal language of [19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) and 19
U.S.C. section 1401(m)] would, as to certain individuals, including
present appellants, subvert the Fourth Amendment." 0 3 It appears
that the court was unwilling to define exceptions to fourth amend-
ment strictures outside of a border search rationale.
This approach to construction of section 1581(a) was made
clearer in United States v. Tilton.0 1 A customs patrol officer ob-
served the launching of a fast ocean going motorboat of a type
known by customs agents to be used for smuggling. The next day a
customs patrol officer saw what he believed to be the same boat
being loaded onto the same trailer with the same truck towing the
trailer. As soon as the boat had been pulled off the ramp and into
the parking area the officer searched and found 880 pounds of mari-
juana. The only authority for the search was section 1581(a) and the
Ninth Circuit began with the proposition from Almeida-Sanchez
that "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitu-
tion."' 05 In examining whether or not the exercise of authority was
reasonable under the fourth amendment, the court began by apply-
ing the extended border search rationale to searches of vessels and
concluded that it was impractical to have check points at the three
mile territorial sea limit and that it was unlikely that passengers or
cargo would be transferred between entry into territorial waters and
final anchorage or docking. Therefore, a vessel arriving from outside
territorial waters at an anchorage in a domestic port would be con-
sidered to be at a functional equivalent of the border. Since there
was no finding that the boat had ever left territorial waters, how-
ever, this theory could not be utilized. The court either distin-
guished older cases in other circuits or said that they now had to be
202. 528 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1975).
203. Id. at 304.
204. 534 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976).
205. Id. at 1364 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)).
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read consistently with Almeida-Sanchez. The court stated:
[A] search without probable cause pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a) of a vessel in a harbor may be valid under the Fourth
Amendment as a border search at the functional equivalent of the
border, not only where, as in Solmes, there is evidence to support
a finding that the boat actually came from international or for-
eign waters, but also where there are articulable facts to support
a reasonably certain conclusion by the customs officers that a
vessel had crossed the border and entered our territorial waters.20"
This holding constrains authority to search under section 1581(a) by
requiring a crossing into territorial waters or a reasonable conclusion
to that effect. Apparently a vessel may not be stopped outside of
territorial waters even if there is a reasonable belief that the vessel
or its cargo is bound for the United States. In effect this extinguishes
the contiguous zone for customs enforcement purposes in the ab-
sence of probable cause to believe a violation of United State cus-
toms laws is being, or will be, committed. If an actual crossing is
not shown, the customs officer is bound by a higher standard than
probable cause as to his belief that a border was crossed: "The
totality of the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowl-
edge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information
[must] be sufficient in the light of their experience to warrant a
firm belief that a border crossing has occurred." ' 7 The case was
remanded for further proceedings.
In United States v. Ingham2" the Fifth Circuit was able to fit
the fact pattern into the border search exception to probable cause
requirements. The vessel involved had a history of visitation to
foreign ports and this was known by the customs agents. After a
return from international water,2 "1 the vessel was docked and the
customs agents apprehended the defendant ashore. The agents
boarded the vessel, smelled marijuana, and subsequently seized
4000 pounds of the contraband. Defendant was convicted of conspir-
206. 534 F.2d at 1366.
207. Id. at 1366-67 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
208. 502 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1974).
209. The use of the term "international waters" is confusing. Customs waters are high
seas which are international waters. The United States territorial sea extends only 3 miles
from the coast. International waters for international navigational rules also has a different
meaning. It is probable that the court was alluding to the imaginary line 12 miles from the
coast. Landward from that line is a customs enforcement zone known in international law as
a contiguous zone. However, the territorial waters (landward from a boundary 3 miles from
the coast) may have been intended since, from a territorial aspect, this is the seaward
"border" of the United States. It was not necessary to expound on these terms in the instant
case since the vessel had visited a foreign port and was boarded while docked in a United
States port and it therefore crossed all of the boundaries.
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acy to import, importation, and possession with intent to distrib-
ute. ' The court would not accept a mechanical and unrealistic
requirement that the vessel be seen crossing the, boundary between
international and customs waters. The court also rejected a conten-
tion that the search was unreasonable because the agents had
elected not to search the vessel at the point of crossing, had elected
not to follow the vessel after the crossing, and had failed to obtain
a warrant when there had been sufficient time both before and after
the crossing. In distinguishing Ninth Circuit cases, the court im-
plied that it was requiring some indication of a border crossing or
pursuit or surveillance after the crossing to validate the search.
Almeida-Sanchez was not applicable to these facts because there
was reason to believe that this vessel had crossed the border and,
further, that the protection of revenues and national security enti-
tled the agents to search a "newly arrived" vessel. The court indi-
cated that it was only stating principles sufficient to validate the
instant search and that it recognized the problems of policing the
seaward frontiers by stating:
Moreover, loath as we are to suggest further distinctions in this
dynamic ever-expanding area [referring to the Almeida-Sanchez
border search criteria], this may well be a Reverian "one if by
land, two if by sea." For there is by act of God, nature, the
Congress, and the activities of man a great difference between the
landlocked vehicle and the nautical vessel in relation to our Inter-
national borders. Congress has long recognized this and the law
has to-and does-reckon with these differences often very spe-
cifically. 1'
Although the panel opinion was subsequently vacated,' the
Fifth Circuit disclosed certain reservations about section 1581(a) in
United States v. Caraway."3 Defendants were convicted of conspir-
acy to import and importation of six pounds of marijuana. The
marijuana arrived at Miami International Airport in a trunk ad-
dressed to defendant. Upon being claimed by a friend of defendant,
the customs agents searched the trunk, found the marijuana and set
up a controlled delivery to defendant. During the subsequent deliv-
ery at a marina, defendant was arrested and the customs officers
made a warrantless exploratory search of defendant's unoccupied
houseboat which was moored at a dock and had an engine disman-
tled and lying on the dock. At the trial, the District Court judge
210. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 952(a), 963 (1970).
211. 502 F.2d at 1290.
212. 483 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1973).
213. 474 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973).
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found no probable cause and no border search because there was no
knowledge that the boat had been outside territorial waters, but
relying on 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) he refused to suppress the evi-
dence. On appeal the Fifth Circuit panel opinion stated that the
district court's construction of 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) would ren-
der the statute unconstitutional."' The court noted that customs
officials conducting border searches may search without probable
cause but that the "mere suspicion" standard involved did not ob-
viate the necessity of complying with a constitutional reasonable-
ness standard. The court also analyzed the extended border search
rationale"' but found it inapplicable because the contraband was
never placed on board the houseboat and the boat did not cross any
border. There was no probable cause, and exigent circumstances
were lacking due to the immobility of the boat. The court concluded
by citing two district court cases"1' for the propositions that section
1581(a) did not apply to private pleasure craft and that even if
section 1581(a) did apply it would not give government officials the
right to conduct an exploratory search unless the initial boarding
revealed an apparent violation of navigation or revenue laws. Al-
though this case has no precedential value it indicates the reasoning
of several judges of the Fifth Circuit.
The most recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Stanley,
2 1 7
dealt with a vessel leaving the United States with 11,000 pounds of
marijuana on board. The vessel was seen departing from a United
States harbor and was sighted nine miles out at sea and boarded
shortly thereafter. Thus, there was no question that the vessel had
crossed the three mile territorial sea border. Marijuana debris
around a truck stuck on a dock had led a deputy sheriff to believe
that contraband had been loaded aboard a vessel leaving the harbor.
There was no link between this marijuana debris and the vessel
boarded by the Coast Guard and therefore the search could not be
justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The court
analogized the factual situation to Almeida-Sanchez. Stating that
a search based solely on 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) could not sweep
more broadly than the fourth amendment would allow and that,
unless the search fell within an exception to the warrantless search
requirements, probable cause or consent would be necessary, the
214. Id. at 30.
215. See notes 163-68 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the attributes of
an extended border search.
216. Fish v. Brophy, 52 F.2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. Coppolo, 2 F. Supp.
115 (D.N.J. 1932).
217. 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
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court referred to Tilton, Solmes and Ingham as cases dealing with
the border search exception. It then analyzed the justifications for
border searches of incoming vessels to ascertain whether the same
policies applied to departing vessels. The court stated that several
aspects of the customs border search were common to vessels enter-
ing or leaving: (1) protection of a vital interest, namely the preven-
tion of drug trafficking; (2) the likelihood of smuggling attempts at
the border; (3) difficulty in detection; (4) persons crossing the bor-
der are on notice that their privacy may be invaded; and (5) persons
are searched only because of their membership in a morally neutral
class. Thus, the similarity of purpose, rationale and effect qualified
the instant search as a border search and the court held that:
[A] search in customs waters is a functional border search when
the vessel has crossed from territorial waters of the United States
and there is sufficient evidence to convince a fact finder, to a
reasonable certainty, that any contraband which might be found
at the time of the search was also aboard at the border crossing."'
Although Ingham was the last case involving vessel searches
in the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Brennan,"9 involving an air-
plane search, contains language indicating that the Fifth Circuit
may well apply the limitations of Almeida-Sanchez regarding bor-
der patrol searches to all customs searches. The reasons given are
that: (1) the interests to be protected are the same, namely the
protection of the physical and fiscal interests of the United States;
(2) the balance between "the governmental interests to be protected
and the consequences to innocent members of the public if the
probable cause barrier is lowered" is similar; and (3) other circuits
have drawn the analogy.2 0 Thus, it appears that the Fifth Circuit
is bound in the same direction as the Ninth Circuit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The analogy of Coast Guard boardings and searches at sea to
the Almeida-Sanchez decision is inappropriate due to factual, theo-
retical and policy distinctions. Faced with an enormous length of
coastline and a vast expanse of ocean to police, the Coast Guard
encounters a much more difficult task than the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. A citizen in a vehicle on land is subject to
the jurisdiction of numerouus police departments and the overlap-
218. Id. at 667.
219. 538 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1976).
220. Id. at 719. The court cited Solmes for authority that other circuits have drawn the
analogy. Id. at 719 n.10.
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ping controls of several layers of government. Persons aboard ves-
sels, however, are easily lost from surveillance while at sea and
subject to infrequent government control. Unlike a land bound citi-
zen in constant contact with the government and police, the mobil-
ity and anonymity of persons aboard vessels at sea require that the
government be able to exercise effective control when an opportun-
ity is presented. The recent cases addressing this issue recognize this
strong governmental interest but have been unwilling to circumvent
the probable cause requirement for customs boardings outside of the
border search exception. What then will the courts do when a vessel
is boarded under authority of 19 U.S.C. section 1581(a) when it is
within the twelve mile customs enforcement zone or within terri-
torial or internal waters and there are no articulable facts from
which a reasonable inference of a recent international voyage can be
drawn? The decisions to date severely restrict authority to board as
they appear to require probable cause in such instances. This re-
quirement is impractical for prevention of smuggling. Historically
no such requirement has been imposed either by Congress or by the
Supreme Court. It is arguable that since the first Congress enacted
the initial legislation in this area, after drafting the fourth amend-
ment and submitting it to the states, that these searches may be
deemed totally outside fourth amendment constraints. This impli-
cation is even stronger when it is realized that Congress created this
power in the face of the despised general warrants which had led to
the fourth amendment. The boardings and searches were conducted
in 1790 much the same as they are today. Technological changes
have benefited smugglers to a greater extent than the Coast Guard.
Their vessels are capable of faster speeds and greater ranges and are
equipped with detection systems as sophisticated as those the Coast
Guard utilizes for law enforement functions. Furthermore, smug-
glers' vessels now operate within a vast, indistinguishable sea of
recreational boaters.
Traditionally an appropriate concern for individual rights has
not required probable cause for boardings and searches at sea. Ear-
lier in this century the courts accepted this view. It would be diffi-
cult to argue that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
aboard a ship at sea. The individual's right of privacy is violated
upon boarding and the consequent search must be evaluated for its
adherence to reasonable standards of conduct. This requires a full
evaluation of all the circumstances and a balancing of interests and
rights to reach an acceptable accommodation between law enforce-
ment and privacy. The fourth amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger
stated in his concurrence in United States v. Ortiz:
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[Hlistory may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and
appropriate concern for individual rights, unable-or unwill-
ing-to apply the concept of reasonableness explicit in the Fourth
Amendment in order to develop a rational accommodation be-
tween those rights and the literal safety of the country.
I would hope that when we next deal with this problem we
give greater weight to the reality that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures" and to the
frequent admonition that reasonableness must take into account
all the circumstances and balance the rights of the individual
with the needs of society."'
In the balancing equation it is arguable that an expectation of pri-
vacy with regard to boardings to inspect a manifest and inspect for
contraband is not reasonable. There is no historical pattern of de-
struction of liberty in this regard. Safeguards in this area have re-
mained the same since 1790. The privacy expectation is further
lessened by the power to board and search under 14 U.S.C. section
89(a) which is inextricably intertwined with 19 U.S.C. section
1581(a). Pursuant to the duties enumerated in 14 U.S.C. section 2,
the Coast Guard patrols the coast and adjacent waters to aid the
enforcement of navigation and fishing regulations and other federal
laws. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has the duty of enforcing safety
regulations through a systematic program of vessel inspections.
These administrative inspections are required under international
law.222 There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy as to these
safety inspection details.
Requiring probable cause to exercise administrative and cus-
toms control is too great a burden and will result in the flaunting of
navigation, safety and customs laws. It would amount to granting
a license for lawlessness. Perhaps the most succinct argument
against the probable cause requirement is found in United States
v. 146,157 Gallons of Alcohol"'3 where the court stated:
If the contention prevails that customs and Coast Guard officers
may not exercise the authority conferred upon them by [19
221. 422 U.S. 891, 899-900 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). This concurring opinion also
applies to United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
222. The United States has a duty under international law to "effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its
flag." Art. 5, Convention on the High Seas, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315. The maintenance
of public order on the world's oceans depends upon effective control. To insure non-
interference with United States vessels by foreign states it is necessary to exercise control over
them.
223. 3 F. Supp. 450 (D.NJ. 1933).
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U.S.C. § 1581(a)], without having probable cause therefor or a
search warrant, it will follow that the Coast Guard and customs
officers are precluded from making any inspection of American
vessels for violation of any law.
If the Coast Guard and customs officers are prevented from
making thorough inspection of American vessels, it will mean
that the smugglers of contraband, narcotics, liquor, stowaways,
foreign merchandise, dutiable and free, prohibited importations,
such as infected plants, fruits, etc., or owners of privateers, the
masters of filibusters, need only maintain an outward air of re-
spectability and legality to escape discovery, and it will surround
them with and assure them of an immunity that was never in-
tended."4
The policy reasons for allowing warrantless non-probable cause
searches of vessels within twelve miles of the coast are: (1) the
difficulty in effectively policing the seaward national boundaries;
(2) the likelihood of smuggling contraband or illegal aliens by sea;
(3) the governmental interest in protection of the revenue, health
and safety laws and national security; (4) the universal understand-
ing that customs laws may be enforced in the contiguous zone,
territorial sea and internal waters; and (5) the vessels searched are
of a morally neutral class. These are basically the same rationales
used to justify an actual border search.
For customs purposes these rationales have been and must con-
tinue to be extended into the contiguous zone for both American and
foreign vessels. However, as was discussed in the jurisdiction sec-
tion, this need must be balanced against the concept of freedom of
the high seas with regard to foreign vessels. The interest to be pro-
tected must be regarded as important in the international com-
munity and it appears that enforcement of customs laws, especially
as they relate to suppression of narcotics smuggling, is considered
sufficient to justify the intrusion.225 To search foreign vessels, how-
ever, a higher standard of suspicion is required and probably ap-
proaches, if it does not equal, probable cause to believe the vessel
is engaged in smuggling, or knowledge that the vessel is bound for
the United States. Theoretically this high standard of suspicion
may not be required since reasonableness is determined by balanc-
224. Id. at 455-56.
225. Present international agreement allows for enforcement of customs laws in the
contiguous zone. It is noteworthy that the Revised Single Negotiating Text of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (May 10, 1976), although merely a proce-
dural text to provide a basis for further discussion, contains several explicit references to
suppression of drug smuggling. See, e.g., article 96.
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ing the significant interest of the coastal state against the following
facts: the detention is short, the search is not unduly burdensome,
and there are no practical alternatives for effective enforcement.
The standard for customs searches of American vessels in the
contiguous zone need not be as high as that for foreign vessels. The
standard should be that of mere suspicion since the search may
theoretically be likened to searches at the functional equivalent of
the border. The same reasons for implementing a contiguous zone
justify this theoretical base. When American vessels are within ter-
ritorial or internal waters boarding officers should not be required
to have either observed the vessel crossing an imaginary line three
miles at sea or be reasonably suspicious to that effect. The theory
that a nation's perimeters are expandable for purposes of border
searches may be utilized as a starting point. It is unreasonable to
presume that all illegally entering contraband can be apprehended
at the three mile territorial sea limit. The fourth amendment has
made reasonable accommodation to the necessity for border
searches ashore within the nation's boundaries and the same policy
is even stronger for vessel searches. Proof of a border crossing is not
the sine qua non of a border search. Courts have found that persons
and vehicles in and around a border zone may be proper subjects of
a search by customs officers if there is direct contact with, or some
reasonable relationship between, the person or vehicle and the bor-
der area.226 The ease of crossing the three mile limit practically
anywhere along the coast and the inability of customs agents to
observe or know of these numerous and frequent crossings creates
this reasonable relationship between any vessel and the border.
Administrative inspections for compliance with safety and nav-
igation regulations often lead to probable cause for further search
and eventual seizure for violations of other federal laws. There is no
carte blanche to search private books and papers under this power,
however. The direct interest of the United States in the safety and
administration of its flag vessels can be analogized to the tradition-
ally high government interest in control of the liquor and firearms
industies. Spontaneous inspections are critical to the effective polic-
ing of its flag vessels. As long as the Coast Guard can indicate that
the initial boarding for administrative inspection and the actual
inspection were conducted in an unintrusive manner, the courts are
likely to sustain the initial search and any collateral searches it may
have fostered.
226. See, e.g., United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Murray, 354 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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Although from a historical viewpoint it appears that searches
at sea were considered to be outside the fourth amendment, it does
not appear that courts today will sustain these searches on that
basis alone. Recognition by the courts that the theories espoused to
sustain searches in other analogous areas are appropriate in the
seaward situation should lead to sustaining the broad authority of
the Coast Guard. All of the theories, from the exigent circumstances
of the automobile cases, to the urgent federal interest in the admin-
istrative cases, to the recognized policies inherent in the extended
border search rationale, converge in the unique role the Coast Guard
plays with respect to vessels. As long as the actual boarding proce-
dures are constrained by implemented regulations, the searches
should remain free from unreasonable intrusiveness. The courts to
date have been diligent in their efforts to uphold vessel searches
without probable cause, but the trend toward expansion of the ap-
plication of Almeida-Sanchez bodes ill for effective searches at sea.
